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DANDIN'S KĀVYĀDARŚA

PARICHCHHEDA II

EDITED WITH A NEW

SANSKRIT COMMENTARY AND ENGLISH NOTES

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PARICHHEDA II

Notes to II. 1—(i) Compare Note (i) to I. 10. Kāvya, according to Dandin, is—*शब्दोपनिबन्धनं वचनम्*; that is to say, he gives more prominence to the word element in poetry as compared with the sense-element. This does not mean that the Gunas which are the *sine qua non* of poetry, and the Alamkāras which serve as decoration, must belong to the word-element, the *शब्द*, exclusively; for, the *रित्य*, the subordinate elements of the Body, have also their own decorations. Thus there is no inconsistency in Dandin's having defined Kāvya as he has done and then having divided the Alamkāras (and impliedly the Gunas also—cp Note (i) to I. 41) into those belonging to word and those belonging to sense. Modern Alamkārikas such as Mammata, having once subordinated both the word as well as the sense to Rasa, are constrained to regard the Gunas as well as the Alamkāras as belonging to Rasa, the adya. For a criticism of this view see our Note (ii) to I. 41 and the Sanskrit Commentary to the present stanza.

(ii) The distinct function of the Gunas and the Alamkāras is brought out by Dandin by calling the former the life-breaths and the latter the ornaments of poetry. The Gunas abide in poetry *साधयन्त्य* while the Alamkāras *शोभयन्त्य*, there is between them a distinction in kind,—a distinction which later became one of degree, as with *वचन* (III 1 1-2) or with *प्रतिपद* (p 17)—*एतन् वचनं वाच्यते शब्दोपनिबन्धनं* । *एतन् प्रत्ययपदनिबन्धनं* । *एतन् वाच्यते शब्दोपनिबन्धनं* । Compare however the following from *महेश्वर* p 20—

अथवाच्यते वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ।
प्रत्ययपदम् वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ॥
अथवाच्यते वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ।
प्रत्ययपदम् वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ॥

Compare also (Agnipurāṇa 346 1)—

अथवाच्यते वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ।
प्रत्ययपदम् वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम् ॥

Mammata's *अथवाच्यते वाच्यं न वाच्यं प्रत्ययपदम्* is the same thing

(iii) The progressive development in the theory, and with it in the number, of the Alamkāras forms an interesting chapter in the history of Sanskrit Rhetoric. The subject is too large, however, to be adequately discussed in a note. Our Introduction has attempted a rapid review of the main stages reached during the process, to which the reader is therefore referred. It would be noted in this place that Dandin must have lived at a time when the development of the Alamkāras in the way of progressive division and subdivision was in full swing; and he seems to have been anxious rather to give an epitomized statement of the principal results arrived at than to add his own quota to the process of amplification. In fact he has even had to reject some of the Alamkāras recognised by his predecessors (cp II 358-359 and notes thereon)

Notes to II 2—(i) The *fundamental divisions* of the Alamkāras have been variously stated in different texts. The simplest division into मन्त्र and श्लोक, even after the addition of a third class of वृत्त, proved quite inadequate. It is however given by the भण्डवर्ण, and most elaborately by Bhoja. It was soon found necessary to introduce various subclassifications based on the psychological principles involved in the process, or on some well underlying peculiarity. Similarity, identity, contrast, causality in word grouping, *lekhanāhāra*; Kāsa Rhetoric. Frictionality these were some of the principles of classification accepted. Compare, for instance, the Alamkārasurvāsa, and particularly the *Śaṅkara* list based upon the *Pratiparudhī* (pp. 338-339) where certain Alamkāras not recognised by Dandin are shown in square brackets:—

मन्त्रः । श्लोकः । वृत्तः । अष्टादशः । मन्त्रः ।
 श्लोकः । वृत्तः । अष्टादशः । मन्त्रः ।
 श्लोकः । वृत्तः । अष्टादशः । मन्त्रः ।
 श्लोकः । वृत्तः । अष्टादशः । मन्त्रः ।

मन्त्रः ।

उपेक्षा, अतिशयोक्ति, —based on अव्ययवाच्यः

विभावना, विशेषोक्ति, [विपन्न, भिन्न, अगम्यति, अगम्योम्य, व्यापात, अतद्गुण,]
भारिक, [विशेष,] —based on विशेष;

यथासंख्या, [परिसंख्या, अर्थोपनि, विद्वत्, समुच्चय,] —based on
वाक्यन्यायः;

परिपुष्टि, [प्रत्यनीक, तद्वत्,] गम्यति (= गमाहित), [राग,] स्वभावोक्ति,
उदात्त, [विशेषोक्ति,] —based on लोभव्यवहारः;

[वाक्यलिङ्ग, अनुमान,] अर्थान्तरन्याय, —based on तर्कन्यायः;

[कारकमात्रा, एकावली, मातृदीर्घ, मार,] —based on शृङ्खलवेविभ्यः;

[व्याजोक्ति, वक्तोक्ति, योजन,] —based on आहुवः; and

गमाजोक्ति, [परिहर,] —based on विशेषणवेविभ्यः.

It became soon obvious that any such classificatory principle or principles, would gradually tend to become *inadequate*, as there would always remain some *Alamkāras* recognised by rhetoricians and falling outside their scope. Thus of the 35 or rather 31 *Alamkāras* recognised by Dandin the following 14 are not included in the above list. —आर्ति, आक्षेप, हेतु, गूढ, वेद्य, प्रेयस्, रस-
वत्, कर्तृस्त्वित्, पर्यायोक्त, भिन्न, विरंभ, अप्रस्तुतदर्शना, व्याख्युति, and
आशी. (not to mention गरिर्ण) Some of these, e.g., प्रेयस्,
रसवत्, कर्तृस्त्वित्, are sometimes classed as गम्यवत्; while
आक्षेप, पर्यायोक्त, अप्रस्तुतदर्शना, व्याख्युति and आशी will have to
be classed as नाट्यार्च-रसा, i.e., merely as effective modes
of expression, such as those enumerated by Bharata in
the beginning of the 16th chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.
The tendency towards a wanton increase merely in
the number of the *Alamkāras* (and of subdivisions
within an *Alamkāra*), which marked the latest phase
in the history of the *Alamkārasāstra*, made any at-
tempt to trace the *Alamkāras* to their *बीज*—such as
Dandin contemplates—an altogether hopeless task.

(12) But already in some quarters, as in the case of
the *Gunas*,—see note (11) to 41—a revolt against this
gratuitous multiplication of entities had begun to
assert itself. Thus Hemachandra rejects परिहर, दशान्वय,
विशेषोक्ति, भारिक, उदात्त, रसवत्, प्रेयस्, कर्तृस्त्वित्, भाव, गमाहित, आशी,
and प्रत्यनीक as distinct *Alamkāras*—and some of them,
it will be seen, are recognized even by Dandin as
Bhāmaha Udbhata's *Kāvyaalamkārasārasaṃgraha*

Notes

otes to II. 4—(i) We are not quite certain as to the genuineness of this list of Alamkāras (stanzas 4-7), although all the Mss give it. It is the practice of some of the later Alamkārikas to preface their treatment of the Alamkāras by a few mnemonic verses of their own composition, but some writers, e.g. Mammata, have not obliged their would-be students in this manner, and just as in the case of Mammata a commentator has added a versified enumeration at the beginning of the tenth Ullāsa (although never as a part of Mammata's own work), so, it seems to us, must have been the case with Dandin. It is only on some such supposition that we can account for the ungrammatical *दोषवर्ति* (or the unmetrical *दोषवर्ति*); and also for the further fact that in this enumeration some figures (e.g. *सं अन्वयलोप*) appear under strange, and others (e.g. *सं विरोध* for *विरोध*) under misleading, names. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that Āchārya Dandin could not have avoided such solecisms and ambiguities if he had meant it.

(ii) *Vibhavana* is often rendered as Presumption, but that is a name that we must reserve for *अपेक्षा*, which *अपेक्षा* and *अपेक्षा* recognise as a distinct figure-of-speech. It is a Peculiar Causation. It is rather an imagination or a guessing or a divining of a novel cause to set out for the effect that has already taken place. Possibly I motivated *विरोध* will explain the idea of the figure and would serve to distinguish it from *अपेक्षा* and would serve to distinguish it from *विरोध*'s account of the figure is however a little bit different. See below.

(iii) The latter half of this stanza is identical with the latter half of the first half.

Notes to II. 5 (i) The second half of this stanza is identical with the first half of the first half. We have the same upon the same. Later on we see a distinction between the figures.

समाधि (which is the same as Dandin's समाहित) and the figure समाहित which is a रसमूलक Alamkāra. Compare Ruyyaka, pp. 163, 185; Visvanātha, pp. 568, 576; Visveśvara in the Alamkāraśaustubha, pp. 372, 416. Bhoja gives the two figures, but what he calls समाधि approaches the समाधिगुण (cp. note (ii) to i. 93-92), while he does not at all recognise the रसमूलक Alamkāra called समाहित in other texts. Bhoja, however, agrees with Dandin in calling by the name समाहित the figure named समाधि by मम्मट and others.

Notes to II, 6—(i) We have already commented upon the use of the abbreviated name विशेष for विशेषोक्ति. Visesha as a figure distinct from विशेषोक्ति is recognised, amongst others, by Rudrata, Ruyyaka, Mammata, Visvanātha, and Jagannātha.

Notes to II, 7—(i) The figure आर्त्तः recognised by Dandin is recognised by no other Alamkārika except Bhāmaha and Vāgbhata the author of the Kāvyañusāsana. It should be noted, however, that the name occurs amongst the 36 effective literary devices mentioned by Bharata in the beginning of the 16th Chapter. Bhavika usually translated by 'Vision' will have to be rendered, consistently with Dandin's explanation of the term, by some such expression as Sustained-Intuition.

Notes to II, 8—(i) Besides the two names for this figure given by Dandin the figure is also called स्वभाव (अलंकारसंग्रह, p. 35) and स्वभाव (अभिप्राय 344.3); while रुद्र groups this figure along with a number of others under the head of वस्तुव figures, i. e., those that have the portrayal of the thing-as-it-is as their object. Compare (viii 10-12)~

वस्तुवमिति नाम्नेष क्रियते कस्तुम्वद्वयधने यत् ।

पुत्रधर्मवदिति निरुपमवर्तितव्यमेषम् ॥

sarily requires that the objects be two in reality ; and it is this implication that has been expressly brought out by qualifications such as निषे विभिन्नदशाकारादिसादयोः, द्वयोः, भेदे or निप्रयोः । The word उद्भूतम् is represented in other definitions by येनेदृशे, यमत्वादि, इदम् or सन्दम्. The specific mention of the technical terms उद्यमान and उद्यमेय in the definitions and the substitution of the word साधर्म्यम् (यमानो धर्मो यद्येव्यो साधर्माद्यो यद्योर्भावे) for the simpler सादृश्य, as also some late qualifications like, एववावदवाप्य (उद्यमेयोपमायां बन्धद्वयम् सदतिश्यानिवृत्त्याय), उद्यमानोपमेयस्योपमयो, etc. serve to exclude from the sphere of उद्यमा such varieties as अन्योन्योपमा, अद्भुतोपमा, मोदोपमा, रोदयोपमा, निर्णयोपमा, प्रतिषेधोपमा, अगाधारणोपमा, प्रतिरोधोपमा, and तुल्योपमा which Dandin embraces under the general term उद्यमा but which later Ātma-kārikas raised to the dignity of independent figures. Dandin's conception of उद्यमा, and of सादृश्य which is its basis, is thus very wide and general.

(iii) We have already given above (Note (i) to II 2) Vidyānātha's list of figures based on similarly, and the extracts in our Commentary (P. 129) sufficiently illustrate this point. The fundamental importance of the relation of semblance was indeed very early perceived. The Agnipurāṇa for instance divides सत्त्वम् (defined as धर्मगमनम्) into उद्यमा, रूपं सद्भावं and अध्यात्मदाम and २२ similarly defines औपम्यम् as (viii 1) —

सदसद् इति सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वम् सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वम् ।

सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वम् ॥

and enumerates the following figures is based upon that relation —

उद्यमोऽसदसद् सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं ।

सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वम् ॥

उद्यमोऽसदसद् सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं ।

सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वमिदं सत्त्वम् ॥

The justification : — the enumeration of these (and others) as distinct figures (and not mere varieties of उद्यमा) should consist in the clear statement that the एवद-
वृत्तरेखा in these figures is substituted to some other रेखा (of identity, doubt, error, contrast, etc.) Dandin at least, as we will presently see brought in this

early requires that the objects be two in reality ; and it is this implication that has been expressly brought out by qualifications such as मिथो विभिन्नदशाकारादिसदयोः, द्वयोः, भेदे or भिन्नयोः । The word उद्भूतम् is represented in other definitions by वेनेहारि, चमत्कारि, हृद्यम् or सुन्दरम्. The specific mention of the technical terms उपमान and उपमेय in the definitions and the substitution of the word साधर्म्यम् (ममानां धर्मो ययोऽपि साधर्म्यो तयोर्भावः) for the simpler गारव्य, as also some late qualifications like, एकवाचकवाच्य (उपमेयोपयादा वाचकद्वयम् तदतिव्यापकगारव्याय), उपमानोपमेयसम्योगयोः, etc serve to exclude from the sphere of उपा such variations as अन्वयोपमा, अद्भुतोपमा, मोहोपमा, संशयोपमा, निर्णयोपमा, प्रतिरोधोपमा, असाधारणोपमा, प्रतिवस्तुपमा, and तुल्ययोगोपमा which Dandin embraces under the general term उपा but which later Alamkarakas raised to the dignity of independent figures. Dandin's conception of उपा, and of गारव्य which is its basis, is thus very wide and general.

(iii) We have already given above (Note (i) to II 2) Vidyānātha's list of figures based on similarity, and the extracts in our Commentary (p. 129) sufficiently illustrate this point. The fundamental importance of the relation of resemblance was indeed very early perceived. The Agnipurāṇa for instance divides गारव्यम् (defined as धर्मगमनम्) into इमा, एषा गतिः and अधोऽन्वयः and रश्मि similarly divides लोपयम् as (VIII 1) —

तस्मिन् प्रोक्तवन्ति सारव्यं तन् लोपयम् ।

इत्यन्तरमन्तराद्युक्तं तस्मिन् लोपयम् ॥

and enumerates the following figures as based upon that relation —

उपमोऽनेकवाच्यं अनुपमं तस्य समोक्तिः ।

सामान्यमन्तरं च तस्मिन् लोपयम् ॥

उपमयसाधर्म्यं सामान्यं च तस्मिन् लोपयम् ॥

पुनरुक्तिः सामान्यं च तस्मिन् लोपयम् ॥

The justification of the creation of these (and others) as distinct figures (and not mere varieties of उपा) should consist in the clear sense that the, पुनरुक्तिः in these figures is substituted to a mere शैव्य of identity (could never contrast etc.) (i) at least, as we will presently see brought

यदुक्तं विप्रहारत्वं तस्या वैशिष्ट्यमात्मभिः ।
निन्दाप्रशंसाचिन्त्याभावेऽन्त्राभिधीयते ॥
सामान्यगुणनिर्देशान् प्रथममुक्तिं ननु ।
मालोपमादिः सर्वोपि न ज्यायान् विन्दते मुखा ॥

It has to be noted however that the Agnipurāṇa gives a classification of the उपमा analogous to that of Dandin [viz.—धर्म, वस्तु, पदम्पर, विपरीत, नियम, अनियम, समुच्चय, व्यतिरेक, बहु, माला, विक्रिया, भ्रष्टन, मोह, संगम, निधय, वाक्यार्थ, गमन (रसना ?), प्रशंसा, निन्दा, कल्पना, मदर्शी, and अमदर्शी], besides giving another classification into 18 sub-varieties similar to those of Mammata (344. 7-9)—

यमाभेनाममाभेन सा द्विधा प्रतियोगिनः ॥
विप्रदादाभिधानस्य सगमयान्वयोत्तराः ।
उपमा द्योतकदेनोपमेयपदेन च ॥
ताभ्यां च विप्रदान् द्वेषा सगमामान्तिना द्विधा ।
विशिष्यमाणा उपमा भवन्त्यष्टदश शुद्धाः ॥

The varieties called निन्दा and प्रशंसा are even mentioned and illustrated by Bharata himself (xvi. 48 ff.), though neither Bharata nor the Agnipurāṇa mentions the आचिन्त्यासौपमा, the main butt of attack. The author of the Alankāraśekhara gives the following ten sub-varieties of उपमा (xi. 3)—

वाक्यार्थोद्दिश्य भेदनिन्दाभूतविषयया ।
मशयो नियम एव च विविच्यलुपमा दश ॥

But no other writer whose work is extant divides उपमा in the manner adopted by Dandin. Dandin's classification is primitive and, so far as any principle underlies the division, it is just the sense intended by the speaker (अर्थानुरोधेन विभाज)

(viii) We can here advantageously consider some other classifications of उपमा that have been advanced. There is one in particular which might be styled grammatical classification (व्याकरणप्रयोगानुरोधेन) which has been adopted by 332 (p. 16), 332 (var. 3 ff.) 333 and most other later writers. But it seems to be not unknown to the author of the Agnipurāṇa (cp. 344. 8-9) who gives, as just mentioned, 18 varieties based on this principle as against Mammata's 2. These last we will now exhibit in a tabular form—

Later writers have introduced further subtle complexities in this classification which is in the first place made to contain 7 more varieties, 3 under पूर्णा and 4 under लुप्ता and in the next place there is introduced a further principle of five-fold sub-classification: इयं चैक-भेदोपमा वस्त्वलंकाररसलक्षणां प्रधानव्यङ्ग्यानां वस्त्वलंकारयोर्वाच्ययोश्चोपस्कारक-तया एवमेवा । इत्यन्येऽपि प्रभेदाः कुशाग्रोपाधिपणैः स्वयमुद्भावनीयाः । तत्र कचिदनुगाम्येव धर्मः । कचिच्च केवलं विषयप्रतिविम्बभावमापन्नः । कचिदुभयम् । कचिद्वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभावेन फलमिव विषयप्रतिविम्बभावम् । कचिदमज्ञायुत्तरितः । कचिच्च केवलमव्याख्यम् । एभिर्भेदैः प्रागुक्तानां सधर्माणामेव भेदानां यथासम्भवं गुणै- बहुतरा भेदा भवन्ति (रसमहाधर, p. 172 ff.).

(ix) Another principle of division is suggested by Bharata (xvi. 43)—

एकस्यैकेन सा कार्या एकस्य बहुमित्या ।

अनेकेषां तथैकेन कृता बहुमित्या ॥

For illustrations see अलंकारसौप्तिक p. 141 f. The varieties known as मालोपमा and रसोपमा are sub-varieties under the second division of Bharata. Upamā, like Rūpaka, can also be divided as follows:—उपमा द्विविधा नित्यत्वा- सावयवया च । नित्यत्वा द्विधा शुद्धा मालरूपा च । सावयवया द्विधा समसवस्तु- विषया एकदेशविवर्तिनी च । For details see Bhoja (iv. 20 ff.)

(x) Our Sanskrit Commentary on p. 129 quotes a passage from Chitrāmṛtāṇḍī illustrating how an example like चन्द्र इव मुखम्, by a slight phrasing, can be turned into a number of other Alamkāras. As an Alamkāra Upamā is to be kept distinct from रूपक where the सादृश्य (usually defined as तद्विषये सति तद्वत्तुभूयो- धर्मवत्त्व) is निर्दिष्ट, and from उपदेश where, in spite of the occasional presence of words like इव, the matter of the similarity is not लोकरागिद but purely a creation of the poet's imagination. Compare—

यदायमुत्तमोऽर्थो लोकरागिदं मिद्विषयवृत्तिः ।

तदायमेव येन सादरं सादृश्यमाचक्षते ॥

यदा पुनरर्थो लोकरागिदं विद्विषयवृत्तिः ।

तदायमेव येन उपादेशः साधवतापर ॥

(xi) The fourfold requirement of an उपमा, viz. उपमेय, उपमान, सादृश्यत्वम्, and सावयवत्वम् is not always present to Daṇḍin's mind. As Viśveśvara observes (p. 19) दण्डिनस्तु मूलतया प्रतीयमान-साधवता-विषयवृत्ति-साधवताः । He has in fact

cannot constitute an अन्वयेन्द्रियम्, as the साधारणार्थम् in मविना कियति is शीतलम् and that in विपरीत मविरति the दाहकत्व

(ii) This variety is raised to the dignity of a distinct figure called *अभेदोक्ता* by later *Ālamkārikas*. It has been defined by *उद्* as (p. 67)—

अन्योन्येनैव यद् एसादपमानोपमेयता ।

अस्मैदोषनाम्नाहम्ना पञ्चान्तमहानिगमम् ॥

Regarding the qualification पञ्चान्नरहानिमात् In the above definition प्रदीपरेणुगम observes—आत्र उमानोमेयभावे तात्पर्यं किं तु एतदेव दूयदेर्यदि विपरीतं न्यून्यद्वयोः गच्छति तत्पक्षे दिति । अतएव एतत्तादृशव्यतिरिक्तस्य पञ्चान्नरहस्यात् इमेर्विशिष्टात् परस्परमुपमानोमेयभावो न दुष्यति । It is doubtful however whether Dandin is here thinking of the दूययमहाद्वयच्छेदः as much as of the heightening of their mutual excellence — अनोन्योत्कर्षरहितिनी. This implies that both the उपमेय and the उपमान must be प्रसून, as nobody would spend any effort in showing forth to advantage the charm of what is not the theme on hand. Compare the examples given by हेमचन्द्र and अण्ण-यदीति as quoted in our Sanskrit Commentary. Bhoja (iv, 23) calls this उपलोपना.

(iii) In निवर्तमान (ii: 19) the मुनीयमसम्बन्धोद् is expressive grade. Here it is implied only. The implication is to be explained as follows—कदा एव मुनीयमसि मुने बन्धमाये बन्धने बन्धनं भुवनात् । भवति । निवर्तमानं नाभ्यन्तरमस्योभयानुगाधिकारः । तत्र बन्धे मुनीयमस्य सन्धने कथमात्रं भुवनात् । भवत्यस्य नाभ्यन्तरं न चत्वेनेति भवति । अत्रात्र भवति । अत्रात्र भवति । (p. 126)

is. Khamaka recognises *सयम्भवा* as a distinct figure, and it is worth observing that Darwin does not feel it necessary, in formulating the recognition of the *उष्मे* figure, as a distinct figure as he has done for instance in the case of *लङ्घि*, *सन्दर्*, *सम्भवा* and *दृष्टवय* (ii. 358-360) which are figures admitted by Khamasha. As to the point that it may offer any justification for regarding *सिम्भ* as a distinct figure. As for as the circumstance goes therefore we cannot establish any conclusion either way regarding the chromatic vocalisation of *सिम्भ* and *सयम्भवा*.

Notes to II. 19-20—(1) In अनियमोपमा the तृतीयगद्याव्यवच्छेद is made highly probable but is not विरहित. In नियमोपमा it is openly asserted. In अन्योन्योपमा, as we saw, it was left to be inferred. Both these varieties are recognised by the Agnipurāṇa. The अर्जुनरोषोदर defines नियमोपमा as—यस्य इतरस्याप्यस्या साम्यलाभः ।

Notes to II. 21—(1) In धर्मोपमा there is only a single common quality sought to be expressed; in the present variety a large number of these are mentioned; in अतिशयोपमा, the next variety, their number is so overwhelming that the poet contents himself by stating just the one solitary aspect or quality which is not common. Again, in समुपयोपमा more than one साधारण्यम् is brought in; in सूक्ष्मा (II 40) more than one उदाहरण is adduced. The result is that while in the former between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण a number of distinct common qualities are sought to be conveyed, in the latter it is the intensity of the one self-same quality that stands out prominently. The variety is recognised by the Agnipurāṇa.

Notes to II. 22—(1) See Note (1) to II 21. This variety fails to produce the impression of an identity between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण because the शब्द is not entirely 'सम' as happens in a simile (see II 66, below). At the same time it must be remembered that the solitary शब्द between the उदाहरण and the उदाहरण which is put forward is not meant to suggest the superiority or the inferiority of the one over the other, as is the case, for instance in शिखरम् उदाहरण and the Alakara called शिखरम् (II 181).

(2) This variety is not recognised by the Agnipurāṇa unless we choose to identify it with what the Purāṇa styles अतिशयोपमा which is thus defined (III 13) —

अतिशयोपमा इत्युच्यते शिखरम् ।

अतिशयोपमा इत्युच्यते शिखरम् ।

The Agnipurāṇa, as it is called in passing, does not recognise अतिशयोपमा as a distinct figure of speech, but uses

Dandin who does it can only be supposed to have distinguished between अतिशयोक्ता and व्यतिरेक in the manner above indicated. A good example of this variety is given by the अलङ्कारसूत्र (p 30)—

कल्पद्रुमो न जानाति न ददाति बृहस्पतिः ।

अयं च जगतीशानिर्जानाति च ददाति च ॥

Notes to II, 23—Dandin seems to have been alone in recognising उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा as a sub-variety of Upamā. We have already indicated in a general way (cp. Note (x) to II, 14) the distinction between उक्ता and उत्प्रेक्षा. Utprekshā may be said to be more particularly concerned with that human faculty which, Shakespeare tells us, "bodies forth the forms of things unknown and gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name." In a regular Utprekshā it is the actual साम्य between the उपमेय and the उपामान—or some aspect connected with it—that is poetically conceived. In the variety before us there is an उत्प्रेक्षा; but it has nothing to do with the साम्य between मुर and पद्म which is the immediate subject of assertion. The उत्प्रेक्षा comes in only secondarily: the poetic fact of the stones could have been expressed without bringing in the 'brogging of the Moon':

this is not a regular उत्प्रेक्षा but merely an उत्प्रेक्षितोपमा. The Com. भूतानुसन्धिनी however explains—यस्य बहवः विद्वन्-
थावस्थिताया इनेत्यथावयवमुपेक्षा। अत्रापि मुरविषयं वन्दे नित्यं पदेपि तदुपे-
क्षावचनात् उत्प्रेक्षितोपमेनेति ।

Notes to II 24—(i) उक्ता, as the more difficult reading and also the one intrinsically more poetic, seems to be the genuine reading which got ousted by the more familiar word मुर

(ii) This variety has been admitted by the Agbhī-
purāṇa and is thus defined (344 16)—

प्रेक्षितोपमासंभवि विमप्यारोह्य प्रतिबोधिते ।

कविनोपनीयते या प्रथमे मण्डुतोपमा ॥

To assert that the *प्रतियोगिन्* (—उपमान) resembles or can resemble the *अनुयोगिन्* only under conditions impossible of fulfilment is in effect to say that the उपमेय is without a peer. As the conditions are अद्भुत or वेदोपस्थासंभवि the variety is called अद्भुतोपमा, the अद्भुतता consisting not in the component elements (उद्भुतवस्तुत्व, विभ्रान्तलोचनच etc.) taken by themselves, but in the peculiar combination of them that is demanded: अद्भुतोपमायां मिदस्य धर्मिणा धर्म्यन्तरा-वयवयोगोऽद्भुतः as Ca remarks. The *Alamkāraśekhara* calls this same variety अभूतोपमा (defined, p 30, as—यत्रा-गम्यत्वादेन संभवंमाहोप्य साम्यप्रगल्भं सा), a name which Dapdin has reserved for another distinct variety (see II. 38, below.)

(ii) *Adbhutopamā* is to be distinguished from *Ahhūtopamā* and from *Asambhavitopamā*; and the distinction is rather subtle. In *अभूतोपमा* the presumptive उपमान is not a *विनिर्गर्हितवस्तु* wherein the *विशेष्य* cannot coexist with the *विशेष्य*, but rather a single simple वस्तु which is nowhere to be met with in nature, as for instance the concentrated essence of the charms of all lotuses, cp. *समानस्य वस्तुन समवेगेनभाव्यमानस्य वपतादभूतैनाभू-तस्यार्थमिति* (श्रु. II. p 30). In *असंभविर्तमा* it is not the धर्म of a new thing which is ascribed to the *प्रतियोगिन्* and which is incompatible with it (as happens in the *अद्भुतोपमा*), but it is a thing which is ascribed to have a quality which it has never seen or which it has got at it from another point of view. For effecting the comparison between the thing and the thing is as much as a non-existent thing is possible and in an *अद्भुतोपमा* an existing and well-known thing is associated with impossible things brought over from another thing. The ultimate result is that the thing resembles without peer. Such is not the case in an *असंभविर्तमा* where the point of comparison is just the fact of the incompatibility of the धर्म that the धर्म (the thing) is expected to possess, and the comparison does become possible in that respect.

(...) The *असंभविर्तमा* is exemplified by *अग्नि* and the *अग्नि-पितृ* (which merely exists *अग्नि*) comes most near to *अद्भुतोपमा*. *Itarata* the *असंभविर्तमा* is fair 51—

सदन्तो दानयतिर्न लीलायन्वयमिति ।

मनहजा विराजन्ते जडमा इव पर्यायः ॥

Here जडमाविराजन्तस्य or moving mountains is an अद्भुत phenomenon. What भोज calls उपयोपमा is no other than this अद्भुतयोपमा. Bhoja's illustration is the verse उभो यदि ध्योमि etc.; regarding which he remarks (p 352)—अयोपमानार्थमुपयोपमेवेन प्रतीकमन्वयमिदमेव न वादयमभिहितमिति सेयमुपयोपमा । Hamachandra (p. 247) unsuccessfully attempts to make a sort of a distinction between उपयोपमा and कल्पितोपमा; but the most clear presentation of that view is to be seen in Rudrata viii. 13-16. Mammata regards Dandin's अद्भुतयोपमा as a subvariety of अनित्योक्ति.

Notes to II. 25—(i) Upopama springs from the close similarity between the उपमेय and the उपमान, so close that a rational being would go to the length of actually mistaking the one for the other. This variety is accordingly not only a step in advance of अनित्योपमा (where the element of difference was consciously realised) but in advance of रूपद्वय, where the भेद is completely submerged, though it is there at the back of one's consciousness so that an actual blunder cannot arise.

(ii) In सन्देहोपमा (ii. 26) the person is struck by the close similarity but is still doubting. If he perceives the उपमान as उपमान the result would be निर्णयोपमा (ii. 27); but if he perceives the उपमान as उपमेय, the result would be संशयोपमा. Again, if after a temporary but actual error the person corrects himself and perceives the thing as it is, the result would be तत्त्वान्वयोपमा (ii. 36). As between निर्णयोपमा and तत्त्वान्वयोपमा it is to be noticed that while in both the ultimate perception is a real perception, in the former it is preceded by a moment of doubt or hesitation, in the latter by one of actual blunder.

(iii) All the four varieties of उपमा just considered must be based upon सदृश्य. If the doubting or the blundering is the result of normal causes mentioned in—

कामशोकमयोपमादभोरसप्रापुषुता ।

अन्यथापि यन्मतिर्यत्ततोऽविज्ञानमिति ॥

pendent figure. Now Bhāmaha thus defines and illustrates the figure (in 42-43)—

उपमानेन वार्थं च भेदं च वदन् पुन ।
समं देहं वच इत्युच्यते समं देहं विदुषो ॥
विमर्शं वाची न स हि विमर्शने
कुसुमागुधो न धनुरस्य वीथुनम् ।
इति विस्मयादिमृगोपमिभ्यो मर्त-
व्यदि वीक्षिते न लभते र्थनिघट्टम् ॥

But we do not have merely in that fact any certain indication that Daxin could have meant no other writer but Bhāmaha.

Notes t II. 28-29—(i) These two varieties differ from धर्मोपमा (II 15) only in the added circumstance that the मुख्यधर्म is here expressed by paronomastic words, the शेष being भाष्य in the former and वाच्य in the latter (चित्ते खलु धर्मशब्देन गन्तव्यम् अत्र वाच्येन). The two varieties can therefore both of them in a sense be called उपमा, as has been done by the author of the अक्षरभार who gives the joint example (p. 30)—

नमालयसमरणा गजने विस्मयद्वया ।
वालेदेवानमालयं गान् इति नमालयि ॥

is—यत्रोपमानस्य निन्दया प्रतिशेषः सा निन्दोपमा, and the illustration—

मार्गेन्द्रहस्तास्तु निर्वर्णमन्वादेकान्तसौत्वान् कदलं विरोधाः ।
सन्ध्यापि स्योदे परिणतिं रूपं जातास्तुर्वोद्यमानवाद्या ॥

Notes to II. 32—See note (vii) to II. 14 above. Because no other Alamkāra writer known to us (except Vamāna) mentions *साध्याभोरमा* and because Bhāmaha criticises the recognition of this variety, it would be perhaps unsafe to conclude that Bhāmaha must have meant *Dandin* alone, seeing that a vast amount of literature known to Bhāmaha and even mentioned by him by name is no longer available to us.

Notes to II. 33-34—See Note (i) to II. 30 above. The variety called *प्रतिशेषोपमा* it must be admitted comes nearest to the *व्यतिरेक*; we can possibly distinguish them from each other by supposing that in *प्रतिशेषोपमा* the point at issue is the degree of *वर्ण* or *आकाशवर्ण* (the common quality) of the *वस्तुवर्णविशेषिण* *हस्त* and the *गुण*. Both possess it and the moon is declared to be not a match to the face as far as the possession of this quality goes. In *व्यतिरेक* some quality or qualities are stated wherein the *वस्तु* and the *व्यतिरेक* are declared to be equal to one another but at the same time another distinct quality possessed by the *व्यतिरेक* and denied to the *वस्तु* is adduced which serves to establish the superiority of the *व्यतिरेक* over the *वस्तु* considered as a whole.

(iv) In अभाषारणोपमा although the face is declared to be without a peer the form of the assertion is conceived outwardly in the manner of an उपमा. Where however even this outward form is not preserved that is recognised by जगन्नाथ as a distinct figure called अणम. As he says (p. 210 f.)—

धुवनविनयेषु मानवे परितुषे निरुपेय दानवेः ।

न भविष्यति नास्ति नाभवत्ययं यमे भवते तुल्यपदम् ॥

अत्र सर्वेयोरमाननिरेजेन सादृश्यस्याप्रतिष्ठानाद्येवमन्योपि । This however is over-subtlety for which Jagannātha has been taken to task by the author of the *Alamkāra-kaustubha* (p. 174)

Notes to II. 38-39—See Note (ii) to II. 24 above. In regard to the illustration given for अमेभाविनोपमा it has been well observed (anent the ruling that उपमान must be लोचप्रसिद्ध while चन्दनप्रभविश is not लोचप्रसिद्ध)—अत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-
गुणमादा भविष्यति न च त्रिंशु यत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-
गुणमादा भविष्यति न च त्रिंशु यत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-
गुणमादा भविष्यति न च त्रिंशु यत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-
गुणमादा भविष्यति न च त्रिंशु यत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-
गुणमादा भविष्यति न च त्रिंशु यत्र चन्द्रप्रभविशदेर्वा-

Notes to II. 40—(1) Compare Note (i) to II. 21 above. Bharata already tells us (xvi 43)—

एकमेवेन वा वार्ता एवम् बहुविधम् ।

अनेकेषां तथैव वार्ता बहुविधम् ॥

And his examples in order are—गुह्यं मे वार्ता वचनम्, वदता-
दृशं प्रकाशं तथैव, एवमेव वचनमात्रं गुह्यं and यत्र वचनम् । Here of course, in its most primitive form, the distinction is made to depend upon whether the उपमान or the उपमेय or both are in the singular or the plural gender. Now मातृशब्देन (II 42) is वचनं वदति उपमा and in Dandin's statement the distinction between वदता and वदताम् is this. In वदता a number of उदाहरण are adduced in the hope that in their cumulative effect at least they would approximately convey the extent of the common quality possessed by the उदाहरण which they are unable to do singly. In वदताम् on the other hand any one of the several उदाहरण is conceived as being adequate by



(iv) In अनाधारोपमा although the face is declared to be without a peer the form of the assertion is concealed outwardly in the manner of an उपमा. Where however even this outward form is not preserved that is recognised by उपप्राय as a distinct figure called अपन. As he says (p. 210 f.)—सर्वेदेवमनिरेजेममरयोत्तरः । यथा—
 भुवनत्रिदेवि मानवे परितुले विबुधेय दानवे ।
 न भविष्यति नमि नभस्वस्य दमे भवने तुल्यवत् ॥

अत्र सर्वेदेवमाननिरेजेन गार्हस्पत्यप्रतिष्ठापनोपमागन्धेयि । This however is over-subtlety for which Jagannātha has been taken to task by the author of the Alamkāra-kanatubha (p. 174)

Notes to II. 38-39—See Note (ii) to II. 24 above. In regard to the illustration given for अर्गभाविनीमा it has been well observed (ancient the ruling that उपमान must be लोचप्रतिदृष्ट while वन्द्यप्रभावि is not लोचप्रतिदृष्ट)—अत्र वन्द्यप्रभाविदेवी-गुणमाया भविष्यति न वा विनु यथा वन्द्यप्रतिदृष्टिमायाविनी तथा लम्बुगन्ध-पुरा वायु-दम्बुगन्ध-वायु । एवं च अर्गभाविनीमा इत्याय अर्गभाविनीमा-नयनं नयनं विनु अर्गभाविनीमा ननुमायाः गार्हस्पत्यम इति ।

Notes to II. 40—(i) Compare Note (i) to II. 21 above. Bharata already tells us (xvi. 43)—
 सर्वदेवेन मा वादी एवम् वदुःकम्पदा ।
 अनेदेन सर्वदेवेन वदुःकम्पदा ॥

And his examples in order are—दुःख मे ताता वायम्, शता-
 इव प्रसक्तं अनेदेन देवेन वदुःकम्पदा । Here of course, in its most primitive form, the distinction is made to depend upon whether the उपमान or the उपमेय or both are in the singular or the plural gender. Now वन्द्यप्रभावि (ii. 42) is एवम् वदुःकम्पदा and in Dandin's statement the distinction between वदुःकम्पदा and वन्द्यप्रभावि is this. In वदुःकम्पदा a number of उपमेय are adduced in the hope that in their cumulative effect at least they would approximately convey the extent of the common quality possessed by the उपमेय which they are unable to do singly. In वन्द्यप्रभावि on the other hand any one of the several उपमेय is conceived as being adequate to

itself to bring out the common quality, and the wealth of illustration serves merely to show off the poet's प्रतिभा.

Notes to II. 41—(i) The Alamkāraśekhara thus defines and illustrates this variety (p.31)—यत्रोपमेयमुपमानविकारतयोच्यते सा विक्रियोपमा यथा—

हरिणादय तद्वयनादय पद्मात् पद्मपद्माय ।

आदृत्य कान्तिगारं विविरमुज्ज्व मुञ्जो दृष्टिम् ॥

Notes to II. 42— See Note (i) to ii. 40 above. The illustration in the text is based upon identical साधारण्यम्; but this is not essential. With भिन्नसाधारण्यम् a good example of मालोपमा is the familiar stanza—

मानव रश्मि विंश द्विने निबुद्धके

वामने च बाहिरमय्यपर्णाय मदम् ।

कीर्ति च दिशु वितनोति तनोति कीर्ति

किं किं न माधुर्यं कण्ठलेख विद्या ॥

The अलङ्कारकौस्तुभ gives also the following examples—

भयङ्गिनमनामने इत्यप्युदात्तस्य

लगातुनयनीनले प्रणयः किं कीर्ति ॥

मुञ्जमरणादनेनमरणादुपमेय

वदीयतुमापमेयमपि नमरणादुपमेय ॥

Apparently it is a series based upon भिन्नसाधारण्यम् which alone is the essential in मालोपमा by the author of the Agnipurāṇa (p. 14 15)

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥

(ii) Das also does not recognize what is known as रश्मि रश्मि by the Agnipurāṇa (311 20) as—

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥


and thus illustrated by २२ (vi 23)—

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥

रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि रश्मि ॥

For other varieties see Agnipurāṇa pp 151ff and २२२२ pp 15१२

Notes to II. 43-45—(i) By वाच्य Dandin seems to have meant a complete utterance of a thought setting forth all its वस्तु relations: in other words a picture with all appropriate details and back-ground. The face, the eyes, and the teeth form one set as against which is placed the lotus, the bees, and the pollen in the first example; and similar corresponding sets are present in the second example. And when in this manner an अवयवगत अवयविन् is compared with another similar अवयविन्—with the trifling subsidiary distinction of the presence or absence of an additional independent वाच्य for each अवयव—the result is a वाच्यार्थोपमा. Hence it is that after dividing उपमा as shown below—



the author of the *Alamkarakaustubha* cites stanza ii 43 as an example of भेदे परार्थिता, the comparison between one pair of उपमान and उपमेय leading on to and depending upon the next pair

(ii) In the two examples of वाच्यार्थोपमा given by Dandin the समानात्म्य between the various pairs of उपमान and उपमेय in each is clearly felt although not actually expressed. But it is not absolutely necessary that there should be this समानात्म्य everywhere. The अलङ्कार-दोषर cites the following where there is प्रत्येक समानात्म्योपमा—

वाग्निनीलमनकमलपद्मदुर्गं शोभते मन्मथमण्डपम् ।

वाग्निमानसमनमलपद्मदुर्गं शोभते मन्मथमण्डपम् ॥

करतलमाताम्रत्वेन अम्भोद्विज्जनुकरोति In समुदायोपमा (ii. 21) we had a similar presentation of the similarity, only there a number of हेतुs were adduced to bring out the साम्य between the same उपमेय and उपमान; while in the example before us a number of हेतुs are adduced to bring out the साम्य between one and the same उपमेय and a series of उपमानs with which it is to be compared.—As in वदूपमा (ii. 40) or मालोपमा (ii. 42) a series of successive उपमानs are here given but that वेविविध्य upon which this variety primarily turns is the presentation of the साम्य in the form of a हेतु It is perhaps not essential that the हेतुs (and the उपमानs) in a हेतुपमा be always more than one

Notes to II. 51-56—(i) Like गुणs the दोषs have been most elaborately treated by Indian Ālamkārikas. They have been named and classified according as they belong to syllables, words, sentences, sense, sentiments, and alamkāras. A detailed treatment of these is given in the Sāhityadarpaṇa vii. or Kāvyaaprakāśa vii. Dandin affords a treatment of them in this place and later in iii. 125-185. In regard to the Upamāśodhas our Sanskrit Commentary supplies the needful supplementary information from Vāmana, Bhoja, and other writers.

(ii) The extra line in ii. 56 which we have enclosed in square brackets, like a number of other lines and verses, is clearly an interpolation, but having been once accepted in the editio princeps of Premachandra and so passed on into works of reference it would have been most inconvenient to omit them and so change the subsequent verse-numbering. In one place (ii. 158-163) where a transposition of stanzas was felt by us to be on critical grounds absolutely called for we have for the same reason transposed the stanzas and retained their original verse-numbering, believing that nobody would grudge us giving credit for being able to count the numbers from 158 to 163 correctly.

Notes to II. 57-65—(i) Dandin's list of सादृश्यमुख words is *helpful* and is in any case borrowed from him by most subsequent writers, and naturally with variations and attempts at completion. Thus the अनेकार्थशब्दसूत्र supplies words like पुरा चेत्, सोदर, and their synonyme, and even the *Me* variants add one or two more. As the matter is not very vital we did not think it necessary to go into all these later lists with a view to determine the text of Dandin's list, especially as it would have been necessary not only to refer to the printed editions but even the *Me* material of these other alamkāra works.

(ii) The colophon ह्युक्तमवश्यम् (and other similar colophons to mark the conclusion of the treatment of an alamkāra with a number of subdivisions) is generally given in *Me*, with omission of ह्युक्त and substitution of synonyme like गदप etc for अव and other small variants. We have ignored the variants and have generally followed best *Me* authority in giving the colophons or omitting them.

Notes to II. 66—(i) The name of this figure is thus explained—
 ६६— यदा नृ बिभर्षी । उपलभ्यते । तदा (प्रकृतमुपेक्ष्य । ह्युक्तं वदति)
 तदा अत्रार्थोक्तं नृपतये । *Upatāha* has to be carefully dis-

(iv) A समासोक्ति (see il. 205, below) involves an assertion about the अप्रस्तुत which suggests a corresponding assertion about the प्रस्तुत, one assertion being made to do duty for both on the basis of an implied आरोप of the अप्रस्तुत upon the प्रस्तुत based upon सादृश्य. However, in a समासोक्ति the प्रस्तुत is not actually expressed as in a रूपक, and it is because the व्यवहार predicated of the अप्रस्तुत resembles the व्यवहार of the प्रस्तुत which is intended to be described that the प्रस्तुतप्रतीति results by way of an implication. In Rūpaka, on the other hand, the अप्रस्तुत in its entirety (रूप, व्यवहार, and all) is identified with the प्रस्तुत but, at the same time, the basis of this identification or superimposition is not actually expressed. Cp. on the point माहिल्यदर्शण (p. 534)—रूपके अप्रस्तुतम् आत्मस्वरूप-मनिवेशेन प्रस्तुतस्य रूपमवच्छादयति । इह तु स्वावस्थासमारोपेणावच्छादितस्वरूपमेव न पूर्वावस्थानो विशेषयति । अत एवात्र व्यवहारसमारोपो न तु स्वरूपसमारोप इत्याहुः । For further remarks see our Notes to il. 205.

(v) The figure called परिणाम, which not only our author but even मम्मट does not recognise and regarding which, even between those that recognise it—हयकर, विश्वनाथ, विद्याधर, जगन्नाथ and अण्णन्द—there seems to be a slight difference of opinion, is in our opinion a matter of over subtlety. In the line—प्रगल्भेन हृत्पत्रेण वीक्षते मीमांसया ॥ १५ ॥ this is regarded as a रूपक the lotus or अम्बु must transfer its रूप completely to the eye or हृत्. The eye, in other words, must lose all its character as an eye and take upon itself the character of the lotus. Accordingly ॥ १५ ॥ can bloom but cannot see. This is not a रूपक therefore. It cannot also be an उद्गा, for वीक्षण or प्रगल्भ्य cannot become a common property residing more prominently on the उद्गा lotus and less prominently on the उद्गा eye. We must hence invent a new figure in which the अद् between the उद्गा and the उद्गा is निर्गम्य, but the result is not that उद्गा has transferred its रूप to the उद्गा, but rather उद्गा has itself assumed the रूप of the उद्गा so that the lotus can

एकाद्वयरूपक (with the further sub-divisions of युग्म, अयुग्म and विषम) may roughly correspond to एकरूपक. What is known as परम्परितरूपक with its two sub-divisions of अश्लेषमूल and श्लेषमूल are practically one with Dandin's रूपरूपक (II 93) and व्युत्तरूपक (II 87), while the subdivisions based on simple or serial arrangement Dandi does not recognise at all.

(viii) The Ālamkāra-kāustubha observes (p. 228) that some attempt to make out a variety of रूपक called वाक्यार्थरूपक on the analogy of the वाक्यार्थोपमा described in II 43ff.—वाक्यार्थे विषये वाक्यार्थोन्तरोपः वाक्यार्थरूपकम् । यथा विविधोपमायां विशेषणानामुपमानोपमेयभावोर्थगम्यस्तथापि वाक्यार्थव्युत्तरूपदार्थरूपकमर्थगम्यम् । तद्वया—

आत्मनोऽप्य तपोदानैर्निर्मलीकरणं हि यत् ।

क्षालनं भास्वरस्येदं सारले सलिलोत्करैः ॥

This however is regarded by the majority of Ālamkārikas as निदर्शना. Compare the familiar example of it—

वितादन्तरत्नानां यदलङ्कारमार्जनम् ।

इदं धीराण्यलेपेन पाण्डुरीकरणं विधौ. ॥

After a long and technical discussion the अलङ्कारकौस्तुभकार decides against the acceptance of वाक्यार्थरूपक, the instances quoted for it being merely those of निदर्शना. See further our Notes to II 348.

(ix) We have said above (Note II) that in a रूपक the common property can never be expressed as a common property. For a common thing has to be shared by more than one while in a रूपक the उपमान and उपमेय are conceived as but one thing. All the same there is always a common property implied as the very basis of the अन्वय required for रूपक, and if this उपमेय is expressed as belonging to उपमान alone, or primarily to the उपमान and secondarily in a sort of a reflex fashion to उपमेय, it does not violate the requirements of the figure. Consider for example the illustration in II 87. The compound word वसन्तयुग्म is to be dissolved here in a manner so as to give more prominence to अयुग्म (i. e. वसन्तवसन्तयुग्म according to Pāṇini II. 1. 72) and therefore the adjectives सज्जद्वेगोपभोगार्द्ध and अमरप्राथम्योत्तमम् must be

प्रतिरोपमा and नव्यापदव्यपक are quite distinct on the very face of them no attempt need be made to distinguish the one from the other

(iii) But we must learn to clearly distinguish नव्यापदव्यपक from the figure अपहृति as Dandin defines it. To later writers the two are undistinguishable. Some think that in the Rupaka variety one dharmin as a whole is negated and another asserted in its place, while in the alankāra called अपहृति there is the negation of a certain dharma of the dharmin and the assertion of another instead. This, however, will not hold in the case of नव्यापदव्यपक (ii 308). A better differentia would be what is supplied by the adjective उद्गमिनगुणोन्वयम् in the definition, which suggests that the negated (प्रहृत, उपमेय) and the asserted (अप्रहृत, उपनाम) things ought to have a similarity between them. This is not the case in the figure अपहृति where anything can be negated and another asserted in its place : cp. अपहृतिश्चिद्वन्त्याधर्शनम् ।

Notes to II 96—(i) Regarding the subdivisions of Rūpaka Bhāmaha says (ii 22)—यममन्वन्तुविषयमेकदेगविवर्ति च । द्विषा स्वस्मैवेणम् । Consequently when Dandin mentions innumerable varieties of Rupaka as being current he must have had others than Bhāmaha in his mind.

Notes to II. 97—(i) In the various definitions of Dipaka that are in the field two or three issues have been raised. In the first place, is it necessary that दीपक be based upon similarity ? Bharata, Dandin, Bhāmaha, Bhoja, the author of Vāgbhaṭalankāra, and Vīṣṇu-nātha are quite silent on the point. Rudraṭa regards Dipaka as a matter-of-fact (वास्तव) figure and not an औपम्य figure. Udbhaṭa explicitly demands साम्य (p 14)—
आदिमध्यान्तविषय प्राधान्येतरयोगिनः ।
अन्तर्गतेषामप्यर्था यत्र नदीपकं विदुः ॥

while Vāmana (iv 3 18—उपमानोपमेयसाम्येवेष्टा क्रिया), Ruy-yaka (p 71), Mammata (p. 775—महृतिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृतप्रकृतान्य-

नाम), and Jagannātha (p. 322—प्रवृत्तानामप्रवृत्तानां चैवगाधारणधर्मा-
न्वयो दीपयाम), do the same thing; though Mammata, for
instance, admits a variety of दीपय (the so-called वारक-
दीपय) where the गाय is not in evidence. In as much
however as every Dipaka demands one word syntacti-
cally related to more than one sentence, we can
always regard the thing connoted by that word as
the गाय, and so we need not make much of the condi-
tion about the दीपय being गाय, as Ruyyaka puts
it. The next issue raised is about the धर्मिणः that are
said to possess the गाय common धर्म. Most writers
insist that the धर्मिणः be partly प्रवृत्त and partly अप्रवृत्त but
they must not be all either प्रवृत्त alone or अप्रवृत्त alone.
This last, according to them is a case of तुल्ययोगिता (see
Note (i) to II 48, above). Now Dandin is not parti-
cular on this point; his examples suggest that he
admits all प्रवृत्त (e.g. II 100), all अप्रवृत्त (e.g. II 101),
and some प्रवृत्त and some अप्रवृत्त (e.g. II 99). Regard-
ing the distinction between दीपय and तुल्ययोगिता the
following extract from the अलङ्कारवर्णमुद्र (p. 296-297)
may be said to be the last word on the controversy—
अत्र वर्तित—दीपयगोपि तुल्ययोगितायां भेदोक्तः किं धर्मस्य सङ्गुनेन भवत्या-
विशेषात् प्रवृत्ताप्रवृत्तयोर्द्विविधस्य आवाक्यभेदस्याप्यत्रोपि अलङ्कारोत्तरादा-
मगाधकल्पः । अन्यथा केचन सङ्गुद्वयार्थिणिनालङ्कारव्यापारे । तस्मात् प्रवृत्ताभेदे
प्रवृत्ताप्रवृत्तानां चैवगाधारणधर्मस्य तुल्ययोगितायां एव द्वयोर्भेदा वस्तुमुच्यते ।
तस्मादीपयस्य तुल्ययोगितायां भेदो वर्तता प्रवृत्तानां दुरासत् इति तद्विन्दम ।

मानाधिकारकस्यानां लक्षणां गौरवार्थम् ।

एकवचनेन गौरवो यस्तु दीपयमुच्यते ॥

यथा—

गौरवि इमे वृत्तयश्च इत्ता भवेदुपेक्ष्य करोहृदि ।

गोपिनिर्वाणवर्णानि चैव धर्मिणस्तुल्ययोगिनि गरा ॥ १५५ ॥

इति भगवतः भक्तमुनिना (ss-56) दीपयस्य दीपयस्य तत्रैव तुल्ययोगि-
तान्तर्भावोपि वर्तते (१६) ।

(ii) A large number of varieties of Dipaka are con-
ceivable. Dandin first gives a four-fold distinction
based upon the same principle as in II 13 and then
gives three sub-varieties under each according to the
position of the common word. Regarding this last
principle of sub-division Jagannāth's remarks (p. 327)—

वस्तुतस्तु धर्मस्यादिमध्यान्तगतत्वेऽपि चमत्कारवैलक्षण्यभावात् त्रैविच्योक्तिरप्यस्मा-
न्नात् । अन्यथा धर्मस्य उपायुषमभ्योपान्ययनत्वे ततोऽपि किञ्चिन्व्याधिर्देवगुणै-
रचानन्तमेदप्रमदात् । —Mammata and others, as before ob-
served, admit a variety called कारकदीपक defined in the
अलङ्कारकौस्तुभ (p. 291) as—यत्रैकमेव कारकमन्ययमेति कियान् बह्वीन् and
illustrated by विभवाय (p. 520) as—

दूरं समागतवति त्वदि जीवनाथे
भिन्ना मनोभवशरेण तपस्विनी सा ।
उत्तिष्ठति स्वपिति कामगृहं त्वदीय-
मायाति याति हमति भगति क्षणेन ॥

In connection with this variety another similar gra-
tuitous principle of sub-division (not enunciated by
Dandin) turns upon the case of the common कारक, and
so we have Dipakas of कर्म, कर्ण, मंत्रदान, अपादान, मन्त्रिण,
and शोधकण—all severally illustrated in the अलङ्कारकौस्तुभ
pp 292 ff. Regarding कारकदीपक Jayaratha remarks
(p. 133)—अथ एकस्यां प्रस्तुतानामेकस्मात्प्रगतेन समुचीयमानत्वाच्च समुच्चयार्थे-
कानेन न तु कारकदीपकम् । नहि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतानां कियानामोपम्यमद्भावे भानि ।
Similar remarks are also passed by Jagannātha
(pp 141 142). The varieties illustrated by our author
in ll 109 u 111 u 113 are an attempt to combine the
कारकदीपक with the शैव्य of some other figure or mode
of expression while the शैव्य variety and other chain-
varieties can always be superadded to almost every
figure of speech. This shankara is liable to तिर्यक्-
वैरिण्य (illustrated by Jagannātha, p. 348 f.) which
makes the syntactical relation rather difficult to
establish.

Notes to ll 98 102 u. The first line of ll 99 seems to
have been misinterpreted by H. H. Shank. The elephants
are of course the same as war elephants and not 'idle
ones' (regardant) as it is taken.

Notes to ll 123 124 u. The distinction between the
Dipaka variety illustrated in ll 109 and the Figure
called शैव्य illustrated in ll 311 312 consists in the
fact that while the former has to be explained severally in the

repetitions cannot be dispensed with, while in an अर्थे the sense of the passage does not suffer by doing away with the repetitions. In other words, अर्थे can be turned into a दीर्घ while यमर cannot be so transformed.

Notes to II. 120—(i) Different views about the nature of Ākṣheps are current and naturally the definitions of this figure differ from writer to writer. Dandin's definition—प्रतिषेधोक्तिरालोप— is the simplest in the field and of widest application. As Jeggannātha (p. 424) remarks— इत्येव तु निषेधमात्रमाक्षेपः । यमरश्चास्ति नार्द्धारमामान्यलक्षणप्रधानमेव । तत्र व्यङ्ग्यार्थे गति गमनमिति मध्यस्थो निषेधः सर्वव्याप्योऽलौकिकः । Others delimit the field of this ālakṣya to the negation of the उपमान alone. As Vāmsa (iv 327) says— उपमानाक्षेप-
माक्षेपः । नुबन्धार्थं च नैरर्थं च विवक्षितमाक्षेपः, as he explains the Sūtra in his Vṛtti. Vāmsa's example is—

तस्याक्षेपमुपमानि मोक्ष्य मुभयं किं पार्थिवेन्दुना
मोन्दयं पदं दृष्टी यदि च ते किं नाम नीलान्पलेः ।
किं वा कोमलकान्तिभिः किमलये मन्देव विम्बाधरे
हा धातुः पुनरुक्तवन्मुखास्वनाग्नेयवर्णं प्रह ॥

This is the same as प्रतीपलक्षार which Mammata (p. 894) thus defines and explains—

आक्षेप उपमानस्य प्रतीपमुपमेयता ।
तस्यैव यदि वा कस्या तिरस्कारनिबन्धनम् ॥

अस्य धुरं मुतरामुपमेयमेव बोद्धुं प्रोक्तमिति केमन्तैः यत्र उपमानमाक्षिप्यते यदपि तस्यैवोपमानतया प्रसिद्धस्य उपमानान्तर्गतवक्षसा अनादरार्थमुपमेयभावः कल्प्यते तत्र उपमेयस्योपमानप्रतिफलवर्तिन्यात् उभयस्यै प्रतीपम् । As we have seen Mammata's second Pratīpa is the same as Dandin's विपर्ययोपमा (ii 17), while Dandin's प्रतिषेधोपमा (ii 34) perhaps comes nearer to the first kind. The प्रतिषेधालोपकार recognised by the कव्यलघुवन्दनकारिकाकार (stanza 164) is of course a different species altogether.

(ii) Others introduce other delimiting conditions. They say for instance that while आक्षेप is a प्रतिषेधोक्ति it ought not to be a real downright प्रतिषेध. The thing intended ought to be conveyed (in an even more telling fashion) by the apparent denial of it. As the Ālakṣyaśarvasva (p. 114) clearly puts it—

विमयादमित्यादिना प्रथमरेखादि निवृत्त्यर्थक्यादिना वाक्येन समर्थने विद्यत इत्यर्थे
 युद्धो निवेद्यादौ. 1 —As to Bhavishyat Akshepa it is to be
 noted that it is not the same as the वयमागविय variety
 of the other school; for in that variety वस्तुव्यवहार दिव्ययने,
 whereas here it is the *thing* that might happen in
 future that is attempted to be averted by anticipation

Notes to II. 127-130—(i) Compare the illustration given
 in II. 127 with the illustration of Virodha in II 337.
 Most modern writers would regard both as cases of
 Virodha. It will however be observed that while
 the second line of II. 127 is enough to make it an ex-
 ample of Virodha, it is the first line with its denial of
 'tenderness' that makes the verse an example of
 Akshepa.

(ii) The principle underlying these two varieties is
 the same as that in II 15-16

Notes to II 131-132—(i) The example is of the nature of
 an attempt to deny an actually existing fault and the
 consequent fear. The epithet व्युत्पत्ति is to be noted.
 Now in a Vibhāvān (in 109) there is a negation of the
 cause but an assertion of the effect leading to a
 guessing of some subsidiary cause. Here there is a
 negation of the [यथा or principal] cause (देव) but
 likewise a negation of the effect (भय). In addition
 there is an assertion of subsidiary causes of fear such
 as व्युत्पत्ति etc. together with a negation of their effect viz
 fear. Thus fear is an effect of देव (व्यवहार) as well as
 of व्युत्पत्ति (व्यवहार), and if the principal cause is said
 to be lacking there is nothing unusual if the result does
 not follow irrespective of whether the subordinate
 causes are or are not present. Consequently Prema-
 chandra's attempt to distinguish this figure from Vibhā-
 vān (which is reproduced in our Sanskrit Dictionary)
 is not very much called for. The main principle of the
 illustration is the denial of the principal cause
 fault by the force

aniple of *śānter* which combines most of these prohibition-*varieties* and adds some more of its own (p. 309)—

मा माह्वान्पमहत्तं मय पुनः क्षेत्रेन ह्रीने बव-

सिद्धेति प्रभुता यथायदि बुरवेसापुदासीनता ।

ओ जीवामि विना स्वयेति बवनं मीमांसने वा न वा

तन किं शिष्य नाथ यत् समुचिर्न बर्कृ स्वयि प्रस्थिते ॥

Our readers are probably already familiar with the classical passage in this strain from the end of the *Pūrvārtha* of Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*

(ii) Regarding the illustration of *प्रभुताक्षेप* (II. 137) Bhoja observes (p. 427)—अथ यद्यपि यात्रोद्यमः प्रियो ल्यते [नयापि] प्रभुतार्थत्वाद्दीनां वारणानां समन्यतस्मैव न निवारणशक्तम् । अतोऽयं न रोधाः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति ।

(iii) Regarding the illustration of *आशीर्वाचनाक्षेप* (II. 142) Bhoja observes (p. 421)—अथ यद्यपि इत्यस्य विधिवाक्यस्य सम्यगपि ज्ञानं तथैव भूयान् इत्यादिशानुसृत्यैव समन्यतस्मैव न निवारणशक्तम् । अतोऽयं न रोधाः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति । The *Alamkārasarvasva* passes the following comment on the same stanza (p. 120)—अथ यथायदि बालस्य प्रस्थानमात्मनोऽनित्यमप्यनिवारणशक्तमेव विधीयते । न चास्य विधिर्युक्तः अतिशयः । सोऽयं प्रसक्तशक्तौ न निवारणशक्तम् । कलं चाप्य अनित्यस्य प्रस्थानमर्थ-विधानादनिवारणशक्तमेव विधीयते । अतोऽयं न रोधाः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति ।

(iv) Regarding the illustration of *सन्नाक्षेप* (II. 147) Bhoja observes (p. 421)—अथ यद्यपि इत्यस्य विधिवाक्यस्य सम्यगपि ज्ञानं तथैव भूयान् इत्यादिशानुसृत्यैव समन्यतस्मैव न निवारणशक्तम् । अतोऽयं न रोधाः किं तर्हि आक्षेप एव भवति ।

(v) The two stanzas about *वृत्ताक्षेप* (II. 155, 156) are probably interpolations. Our oldest Mss. J and N omit them, and the fact that the Madras edition takes them before the two stanzas dealing with *लोपाक्षेप* points to the same conclusion. The interpolated stanzas were naturally placed at the end of a series dealing with the same theme. We had to retain them in the text so as not to disturb the numbering of the edition.

Notes

Notes to IL 165-166—For Dandin's conception of *atya*—
 दया see Note to IL 169 below.

Notes to IL 167-168—(1) In IL 131 the *वार्त* itself was
 negated; here something else is negated on the
 strength of a *वार्त* or *हेतु* adduced. Generally a *वार्त* is
 a *कारक* or productive cause and a *हेतु* a *कारण* or probatory
 cause. See IL 235.

Notes to IL 168—(1) As in the case of Akehepa, Dandin's
 definition of *Arthantaranyāsa* is also rather crude and
 wanting in the later pruning and refining with a view to
 make it more precise and to delimit its field from that
 of other *alankāras* or sub-varieties of them. To begin
 with, Dandin speaks of *वार्त* प्रत्यक्ष अथवा *वार्त* इत्यादि
वार्त has been here taken to mean a theme or a com-
 plete statement, so that an ordinary *हेतु* of an *अनुमान* is
 naturally excluded. Compare Vamāna, *Vṛtti* ch
 iv 3 21—*वार्तप्रमाणं वदार्थं हेतुमतेन कारणतया* 1 The
 figures-of-speech known as *अनुमान* or *वार्त* (neither of
 which however our author admits) are in consequence
 differentiated from this figure. Between *वार्त* and
अनुमान the element of mutual distinction is the fact
 that in the former it is the *वार्त* (a *वार्त* of *वार्त*) that
 while in the latter it is the *प्रवर्त* (a *वार्त* of *वार्त*) that
 is set forth, and there is further the circumstance that
 in the figure-of-speech known as *अनुमान* there is ad-
 duced the complete paraphernalia of a logical infer-
 ence including the *कारण*. Both the figures neverth-
 less agree in this that both *वार्त* the *वार्त* and *प्रवर्त*
प्रवर्त are individual objects and not statements
 or *वार्त*.

(ii) Objections can be taken however to the ab-
 statement of the case on the ground that in an *अनुमान*
 the *वार्त* is often a condensed and even cor-
 statement and in the *वार्त* *Manirāsa* and on
 recognise a variety where the *वार्त* is a
 Hence a better distinction between *वार्त* and *प्रवर्त*

Notes

which must be carefully grasped. In an अर्थान्तरमात्र there is always समर्थनमर्थक relation between the two वस्तुs, one being adduced in corroboration of the other. Jagannātha gives a clear exposition of 'corroboration' (p. 471)—समर्थनं च हृदयेन हृदयेन वा अर्थादिना गौरवमय प्रतिकल्पः इति चेन्नमेवेति हृदयप्रत्ययः । In प्रतिकल्पमा (and in Dandin's view this embraces the so-called एतन्न—compare Notes to ii. 46) the two वस्तुs are merely related by an element of similarity, upon which in fact the figure depends. एतन्न गौरवप्रतीतिरिति in the definition. The मय or analogy, it is true, may be eventually used as a corroboration but that is not the primary and immediate object of the figure. (Compare प्रतिकल्पः (p. 35)—न एतन्न गौरव [एतन्नमय] समर्थनमर्थकमात्राणादीनां प्रतीति विवरणविशेषमात्रमात्रमत्र एतन्नमयः । अर्थादि तत्र समर्थनमर्थकमात्राणां च । अर्थान्तरमात्रे तु समर्थनमर्थकं भवेन्नोक्तमयः ।

(v) The analogical semblance required for प्रतिकल्पमा [and एतन्न] is more likely to be found between two general statements or between two particular statements, while corroboration is usually made of a particular by a general or of a general by a particular statement. Most later writers accordingly introduce the above circumstance into the very definition of अर्थान्तरमात्र which has been accordingly defined by Haryaka (viii 79)—

प्रतिगम्यार्थेति सामर्थ्यं बलित्वं त्विदमेव ।
इति त्वर्थेति त्विदमेव त्वर्थेति त्वर्थेति ।

by Mammata (p. 804)—

न मयः इति चेन्न हृदयेन हृदयेन वा ।
इति तु समर्थनमयः ।

and by Jagannātha (p. 471)—

मयः चेन्न विवरण विवरणं सामर्थ्यं च । एतन्नमयः त्वर्थेति ।
इति ।

that author however does not regard this as essential and accordingly in ii. 173 he makes no particular corroborate another particular (see Notes to the stanza) । Mammata (ii. 71) Dharmaraja (ii. 61), Vaman (iv. 3. 21) and others give also non-essential definitions.



little to distinguish them from the next pair. As it is however not absolutely necessary that all the varieties go by pair, it would perhaps involve less forced interpretation if श्रेय is given the usual interpretation of the use of words in two senses. The word दक्षिण—upon which the entire point of the corroboration turns—is so used in li. 174. Other sub-varieties, it is true, may also use paronomastic words; but in श्रेयविद् variety it is the most important word that is so used. Compare Ch—दक्षिण्यस्य स्वभाविकार्थं बहवः । तेषु अन्यः साध्यतया निर्दिष्टः साधनभूतेनान्यतमेन साध्यते इति श्रेयविद्भिः । विरोधो युक्तात्मनि युक्तायुक्ते च अर्थान्निरन्यासे श्रेयानुबन्धे सत्यपि प्रागुक्तत्वादेन न द्वयपदेशः ।

(ii) In li. 175 the समर्थवस्तु is made up of a proposition which embraces a विरोध and it is corroborated by another proposition which also embraces a similar विरोध. The two propositions, as we understand matters, are both particular. It would accordingly be an instance of ह्यन्त in other writers; but Dandin would classify it as अर्थान्निरन्यास because the idea of corroboration is evidently the leading idea of the उन्मथ. If the idea of साध्य were the more prominent one it would be, according to Dandin, a case of प्रतिपत्ति. We consequently prefer taking the word दक्षिण in the sense of 'a good brahman'.

Notes to li. 176-17 —(i) The distinctive principle underlying the last four varieties is very elusive. In li. 176 the समर्थवस्तु (and not the समर्थवस्तु also as in li. 175) involves some one doing something improper or against one's nature, in li. 177 both the समर्थ and the समर्थ propositions involve the doing of an appropriate action, in li. 178 the action in the समर्थ proposition is accordant for one agent but discordant for another agent, and in li. 179 the action is discordant for one agent and therefore accordant for another agent. Ch and Cs understand विरोध-अन्यभावपत्ति or अतथाभवम् and explain इ-दं विरोधः [अन्य] भवति । अन्यपि विरोधेन भवितव्यम् । अतः विरोधः । The point is however debatable.

Ruyyaka (p 80) explains the point of the example of

and

Vīvanātha the author of *गीर्वाणदर्शन* side with the older school while Jagannātha follows Mammāla. The following full extract from the *खण्डपुर* (pp. 352-353)

will make the position on either side quite clear—
मन्त्रं सामानादुपमेयस्य न्यूनत्वं ध्वनिरेक इति न मुक्तम् तस्य हि वामवेनाह-
त्यात् । यौवनस्य चाग्निस्त्वै प्रतिरावे चन्द्रोपस्थाधिकगुणत्वमेव विवक्षितम् यदेन-
चन्द्रवत् यानं गग्न पुनरायातानि । [इति चेदमदेनत्] यतोऽत्र चन्द्रवत्त्वं गणीयत्वं
यदि पुनरागच्छेत् तत् प्रिवं प्रति विरमीर्ष्याद्यनुकूलो भूभ्येन । इदं पुनरृतयोर्वनं
तत्तं एव सार्वज्ञिकप्रतीति र्मुक्तं सार्वज्ञिकप्रतीतिक्रियात्मकेन तिरोक्ता मद्र पत्र

[illegible]

वचने शब्दादयश्चिकित्सात्मकेषु विरचितानि न न्यूनगुणानि । शब्दो हि पुनः पुनः
 वचनेन लोके मुक्तः अत एव न गारुडमाहात्म्यमासीत् । इदं च पुनर्यौवनमुपल-
 ब्धमेतानि दुर्लभतत्त्वादयुक्तानि चानादिभिर्मन्त्राद्यैः शब्दजनभाषणीर्बहिर्दृश्य-
 भाषाया मुखा वसयितुमगाग्रजमिति गारुडसप्तगुणहृत्सुहृदयैः शब्दमेव । तत्र
 युगनिदानम् चतुर्धासप्तगुणहृत्सुहृदयोश्च वाचभाषणस्थितौ गारुडसप्तगुणहृत्सुहृदयैः
 शब्दमिदं विमित्यस्य चतुर्थयौवनस्य इत्येवमात्मनादित्येवमात्रं नाम यौवनमिति
 प्रतिरुत्तेनार्थेन प्रकृतार्थस्याप्युत्तरात् ।

Notes to II. 181-184—(1) As we have seen (Note III) to ii 180) it has been customary to have, along with ए and उभय Vyatireka, अनुभय Vyatireka with the three sub-varieties depending upon the manner of expressing वाच्यम्, each with further two-fold differentiation depending upon the presence or absence of अय. The three अय varieties from out of these six are declared to be impossible. Says Uddyota on Kavyaprakāśa pradīpa (p 793)—अत्रैवं विन्यसम् । उदयव्यतिरेकादौ अदेवेव अद्वितीयेष्व अयमलक्ष्यमुच्यते ननु यत्र द्वयं वि अदेवे । एवं बोधयानुसारे अद्वयव्यतिरेकं विन्यसेत् । To which may be added the conclusion of Jagannātha—एवं च अनुविहितेन द्वि प्राकृत्युक्तिर्द्विपुलपदस्य निर्वेधावर्थाविशेषादनीदा ।

Notes to II. 185-188—(i) These three varieties are an attempt, after Dandin's manner, to combine the *कैवल्य* of this figure with that of some other figure or figures.

Notes to II. 189—(i) As before observed (Note (iii) to II. 180), *सन्दोषाद्युक्तमादृत्य* includes what is called *सादृश्यान्वय* as well as *आयंशान्वये*. Regarding this distinction Mamata's notes (pp. 661 ff.)—*यथेवतादिमज्जा-वत्सराः तस्यैवोपमानाप्रतीतिरिति यद्यप्युपमानविशेषणान्वयेन तथापि सत्यमवितिमहिम्ना ध्रुवैव पठ्यन्तु मन्वरी प्र-पादयन्तीति तन्मद्रावे श्रौती उपमा । तथैव तत्र तस्यैव (पा० V. L. 116) इत्यनेन विहितस्य कवेरुपादाने ॥ तेन तुल्यं मुच्यते इत्यादावुच्यते एव तत्र तुल्यम् इत्यादौ चोपमाने एव इदं च तत्र तुल्यम् इत्युच्यतेऽपि तुल्योपादाने विहित-रिति साम्यस्यान्वयेनवा तुल्यताप्रतीतिरिति साम्यस्य आर्थत्वात् तुल्योपादाने-पादाने आपत्तिः । तद्वत् तेन तुल्यं क्रिया चेदितिः (पा० V. L. 115) इत्यनेन विहितस्य कवेः स्थितौ ॥ In *प्रतीयमानमादृत्य* the *उपमावाचकशब्द* is altogether absent.*

Notes to II. 190-192—(i) Compare II. 190 with II. 22. In the latter *इत्येव भिदा नोम्या* emphatically declares the *साधर्म्यं*. In the former only the *भेद* is stated and the *साधर्म्यं* is left to be inferred. It should also be noted that II. 22 mentions a circumstance that can be regarded as *सामान्यरूपदेतु* while the *प्रत्ययेति* of II. 190—by an easy change into *प्रत्ययेति* and even without it—can constitute an *सामान्यरूपदेतु*.

(ii) On II. 191, which Bhoja quotes, he observes (p. 237)—*अथ सन्निवृत्तेऽनयोः प्रतीत्यमन्वयादयो-ध्रुवि सगमद्वयानो नदमापे-च विमर्शो भेदकारिणि मन्वरी प्रतीयमानमादृत्योपमानाध्वनितेकः ।*

Notes to II. 193-195—(i) The essence of a *साधर्म्यनिरुक्त* consists in the fact that in it what is offered as a *भेद* or distinguishing characteristic between the *समान* and the *द्वन्द्व* has in it an element of *सदृश*. The *सदृश* however is sufficiently subdued to allow the *भेदप्रतीति* to gain hold upon our mind at least in the first instance. Bhoja observes on this stanza as follows (p. 305)—

(iv) A better way of understanding the passage would probably be to regard II. 194 as forming one example of महाव्यतिरेक with प्रतीयमान (= शब्दानुगत) नाम्य. Thus—

उपमान—चन्द्र

उपमेय—हंस

शब्दानुपात्तनाम्य—मुदि, which is apprehended first (प्रतीत)

भेदक—नभस्, पयः

भेदकमादय—नक्षत्रमादिना, ऊर्ध्वमुदयः; this is apprehended as an after-thought.

The only difficulty in the way of this interpretation is the two dual locatives (or genitives) connected by च in II. 195. The locatives can be translated by—"between the moon and the bansa, in regard to sky and water, a difference etc.", and च could be regarded as explanatory. Bhoja, it must be added, favours the earlier interpretation. His remarks on this stanza are (p. 305)—
अत्र पूर्वार्धे चन्द्रहंसयोः प्रतीयमाननाम्ययोरम्बरोत्तमत्वतोयभूतत्वे उपरार्धे तु नभःपयसोर्नक्षत्रमालिन्वोत्तुमुदत्वे मह्ये एव भेदके । सोऽयं प्रतीयमानसादयसो महाव्यतिरेकः ।

Notes to II. 197-198—(i) Bhoja remarks on this illustration as follows (p. 303)—अत्र यौवनप्रभवस्य तमसः तमोनात्मा सौ शशिरोत्करमिति सादृश्यमुक्त्वा अस्मात्त्वोरमहायमकार्यं सूर्यरश्मिभिरिति व्यतिरेको विहितः । सोऽयं स्वजातिव्यतिरेकः ।

(ii) This stanza is made to support the weight of a chronological argument for the priority of Bāna's Kādambari over the Kāvya-darśa of Dandin—a weight which it is too weak to sustain, for, even though the conclusion be sound it should not be supported by an unsound argument. Petarson (Dasakumāra, First Edition, Preface) and Pandit Maheschandra Nyāyaratna before him (A. S. B., Proceedings 1887, p. 193) regard Kāvya-darśa II. 197 as a reminiscence of Bāna in his Kādambari, (B. S. S. p. 103, l. 16)—केवलं च निमग्न एव अमृत-भेदमस्मात्सौरोऽष्टौमप्रदीपप्रभाभेयमनिगहनं तमो यौवनप्रभवम् । Nothing need hinder us, as far as the two passages alone are concerned, from regarding the Kādambari idea as an elaboration of that in the Kāvya-darśa. More probably the two are quite independent of each other.



Bhāmaha (ll. 81) and Udbhata (p. 40)—

निमित्ततो बबो यत्तु (यत्तु बबः Uddbhata) लोकातिक्रान्तयेवम्।
मन्यन्तेतिशयोक्तिं तामलङ्कारनया यथा (बुनाः Uddbhata) ॥

Hemachandra (p. 264)—

विशेषविशेषा भेदभेदयोगायोगव्यवस्थानिश्चयोक्तिः ।

Vagbhata (p. 37)—

अन्युत्तरितिरायांति ।

Vamana (iv 3. 10) —

ममभाष्यपरमं नान्यदर्थं चक्षुष्यानिशयोक्तिः ।

and Bhoja who, besides quoting Kāvya-darśa II 214 and II 230, gives the following extra characterisation of the figure (iv 82, 83)—

मा न शरं भृगव्य न क्रियाणां शान्दस्यते ।

नष्टि शब्दस्य प्रयोगः नान्यतिशयः कश्चित् ॥

प्रभाकर्त्तृगणो यथ दधानुभवनामहः ।

अन्धम्यानिशदा यदा मेघ नानिशदान् वृषह ॥

(iii) It is during the process of division and subdivision of the possible hyperbolic statements of a thing that it is completed by अणुवर्गिक, (Kūvalaya-
Cāntav III, p. 16) into [अणुवर्गिकोत्पत्तिः] भेदघा-
तित्वं अणुवर्गिकोत्पत्तिः, अणुवर्गिकोत्पत्तिः, अणुवर्गि-
कत्वम् at the later idea of the
अणुवर्गिकत्वम् identified by Mammata comes
to the fore as the later division-definitions
are -

Maintains 1p 702)

‘नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय’ इति मन्त्रस्य अर्थः ।

ଅନୁଷ୍ଠାନ ଦଳଦ୍ୱାରା ଦମ୍ଭଧର୍ମୀ ବା ଯୋଗୀ ।

१५६ ए-४०३ : बन्धुद्वयवत् ।

11

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ਸੇਵਾ-ਸ਼ਾਸਤਰ ਅਤੇ ਸਮਾਜ-ਸ਼ਾਸਤਰ ਵਿਖੇ ।

१. ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॥

Hayden (p. 63) - at a split in the matter—

अथैवमपि प्रत्यक्षं - अथैवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ।

[illegible]

Notes

नैव संभवति । अथवा मितप्राप्यन्येवानिप्रत्योक्तिः । अथाथ पत्र प्रकृतः ।
भेदेभेदः । अन्ते भेदः । मन्वेमंभ्यः । अमंभ्यो मन्वः । कार्य-
व्यकरणोवाप्यविश्वंमथ ।

Rudrata perhaps marks the middle stage in this process of evolution in as much as he regards *atishay* not as an independent figure-of-speech but as a rhetorical device of the same kind as comparison or contrast and giving rise to a number of figures (12 in all) which he thus enumerates (ix. 1-2)—

यथाधर्मनियमः प्रगदिवाधाद्विर्यं यानि ।
वधिन् वचिरतिलोकं म म्यादितानिप्रत्ययः ॥
पूर्वविशेषोपेक्षाविमर्शनातदूणाधिविशिष्टोपाः ।
विमर्शसंगतिरिदितम्यापानादेवो भेदाः ॥

Just the opposite of this is the view of Hemachandra who says (p. 267)—एवविशेषे च रात्रि विरये अतिशयोक्तिरेव प्राणवेनाव-
तिष्ठते तां विना प्रायेणालंकारत्वाद्योपादिति न सामान्यमोक्तिरुक्तवर्त्तानिदानीविशे-
पावलंकारोपन्यासः धेयान् ।

(iii) *Atishayokti* understood in this extended sense is called *vakrokti* by Bhāmahe in the oft-quoted stanza (IL 85)—

सैषा सर्ववदकोक्तिरययो विभाव्यते ।
यन्मोक्ष्या वचिना कार्यं कोत्तकरोनवा विना ॥

Vakrokti is formally defined by Vāmana (iv 3b) as गारुड्याशुणा, the point being—यत्र गारुडलक्षणा सारुड्यहद्वेष्टविलम्बिन-
रुद्वार्यप्रतिपत्तिमुद्रावर्तिनः प्रगमने नत्र करोन्तिरुल्लार इति रहस्यम् ।

(iv) The most modern school as represented by Jagannātha (p. 313) and others refuses to recognise the five or more sub-varieties for the figure put forward by the Middle School. As the *Alamkara-kustubha* observes (p. 285)—उत्तमानामयस्य विद्वदोपदेशानमोक्षानुसारेण ।
प्रकारान्तरे भातिरेषालंकारोपदेशानामोक्षानुसारेण । न केचनमुपदेशानामोक्षानु-
सारेणालंकारं संभवति व्येष्टयमोक्षानुसारेणालंकारं स्थापयन् । न केचनमुपदेशानामोक्ष-
मन्वया उपमानमप्युपदेशानामोक्षानुसारेणालंकारं स्थापयन् । न केचनमुपदेशानामोक्ष-
विशेष उपमादीनामोक्षानुसारेणालंकारं स्थापयन् । This school therefore approaches the most ancient school represented among others, by Dandin

(v) Bhoja's statement (iv 82) quoted above probably differentiates अभिज्ञान from अभिज्ञा (i 95); see also our Sanskrit Commentary p. 236 ll. 6-12.

Notes to II. 215-21 —(i) Verse 215 is given by Bhoja (p. 44) as an example of कान्त्यभिप्राय with the remark—अत्रैव कदम्बेन लो हर्षामानिजमेव कदम्बोन्मत्तस्यैव विज्ञा येन तस्मिन् मन्त्रात्मिभ्योऽन्विता विज्ञा न लक्षणे संप्रै कान्त्यभिप्रायो कर्माभिप्रायभेदः । Hemachandra (p. 44) cites this as an example of योगे अयोगः—अत्राभिप्रायः लक्षणप्रियाय, योऽन्विता कदम्बोन्मत्तस्यैव विज्ञा अयोग इत्यः । Mammata would regard the example as containing an independent figure called मालिन or मलिन; but Bhoja observes—अथान्य विज्ञानं हे विज्ञेय । उच्यते । विज्ञेय कदम्बोन्मत्तस्यैव विज्ञा विज्ञा लो विज्ञायेन दृष्टत्वाभाविता मलिन कदम्बोन्मत्तस्यैव इति ।

(ii) The foot-note on p. 257 contains a misprint: For सर्वोदयाणां न नद स्यादमनां for सर्वोदयाणां; and for शोनस्वी in the last line read शोमस्वी.

Notes to II 217-218—(1) B&C (p. 162) gives this as an example of अनुवृत्त with the remark—अत्रैवं स्यादस्य लोकोप-
मांतरमेष तन्निष्ठायाश्च यथा येन न... नान्तरात् स विद्यते । सोऽयं तदनु-
विष्टायामात्मनश्च ।

Notes to II. 219—(1) Bhoja (p. 462) gives this as an example of गुणानिवयन मङ्गलानिवयन and remarks—अथैवं यमोऽग्रेण कथयमानस्या वा श्रुत्येति वा । यमोऽग्रेण । यमः तदनुवादमिति सर्वार्थनाशकत्वे । गाय मङ्गलानिवयो नमोऽनवयमेव । Maxmulla and others recognise this as an independent figure-of-speech called भावरु

Notes to II 220—(i) Bhoja gives other sub-varieties of this figure such as प्रसादनिगय, अनुभसनिगय, and अन्योन्वानिगय or त्रिसानिगय.

(ii) Bhamaha also delivers himself in a similar strain (ii 84)—

इत्येवमभिप्रेक्षित्वा गुणानिश्चययोगः ।

सर्वार्थं चोक्तम् ॥ अत्रैव समाप्तम् ॥

We have already mentioned Rudraṭa's attempt to regard अतिशय as a *fundamentum divisionis* for classifying figures.

Notes to IL 221-225—(i) We give below some of the more important definitions of *Utprekshā*—

Agnipurāṇa (344.24)—

अन्यथोपस्थिता वृत्तिधेतव्योत्तरस्य च ।
अन्यथा अन्यत्वे यत्र सामुद्रेशः प्रवर्तते ॥

Udbhata (p. 43)—

साम्यक्यविश्रुतायां धातुवेदाद्यात्मभिः पदे ।
अनदृश्याव्यायोगादुद्देशातिशयान्विता ॥

Bhāmaha (il 91)—

अतिशयान्वयान्ता निविधोपमया सह ।
अनदृश्याव्यायोगादुद्देशातिशयान्विता ॥

Vāmana (iv. 39)—

अनदृश्याव्यायोगादुद्देशातिशयान्विता ।

Ruyyaka (p 55)—

अत्यवसाये व्यापकप्रधान्ये उद्देशः ।

Rudraṭa (viii 32, 36)—

अतिशयस्यादित्यं विधाय गिद्धोपमानसंज्ञावम् ।
आलोप्यते च तस्मिन्ननुपादीनि सौद्देशा ॥
यत्र विशिष्टे वस्तुनि सत्यमदालोप्यते तर्हि तस्य ।
वाच्यतस्तुपमया तन्मात्रं सौद्देशोद्देशा ॥

Vagbbata (p. 34)—

अत्यन्तसादृश्यादमनोवि धर्मस्य वस्तुनमुपे त ।

Vagbbata (iv 90)—

वस्तुना वाचिद्वौचिकादपार्थक्यं सगोच्यता ।
योतिनेवादिमि सादृश्याद्देशा वा वस्तुना वचः च

Bhoja (iv. 50)—

अन्यथाविधिं वस्तु वस्तुमुद्देशोपमेयता ।
तर्हि तुल्य. विधा चान्ति तामुद्देशं वस्तुने च

Hemachandra (p 247)—

यत्र उद्देशाव्यापकविशिष्टता लोकेतः ।

Vidyanātha (p. 393) and Chitramīmāṃsā (p. 73)—

यन्मन्त्रमर्चयन् सादन्त्येनोन्नतिं विना ।

प्रवृत्तं हि भवेत् प्राज्ञात्म्येऽप्येता प्रवृत्तं ॥

Vidyādhara (vhi 13:—

अप्रकृतत्वेन व्याद्वयव्यादौ गुणाभिर्भवत्तान् ।

गाय प्रकृतम् यदा क्षिप्तोऽप्येषा तदा तर्ज्जः ॥

Matumata (p 707)--

संभावनमद्योग्रेष्ठा प्रतुलम्य गमनं यत् ।

Vishvanātha (x 40)—

भवेत् गभावनोद्येः प्रवृत्तस्य परात्मना ।

Jagannatha (p. 285)—

नद्विप्रत्वेन नद्विप्रत्वेन वा प्रमितस्य पदार्थस्य रमणीयद्वितित्व-
मानार्थिकरणस्य नरनद्विप्रत्वेन नद्विप्रत्वेन वा रमणीय-
सम्यक्ता ।

And *Viṣve-vara* (p. 180) —


१. भाष्येते मह यदा भाम्यप्रतियोगिना तदपनेयम् ।

१॥ सु प्रभाताहर्निषा इत्यादिविषयम् ॥


(ii) All these denotations from the simplest to the most elaborate refer us to the essentials. The points to be noted are: 1 That it should be a समान = अन्यतोत्प्रेक्षण = अन्यथा यवमान = अन्यथा कल्पन = अन्यत्वेनोपलक्षण = असदरोपण, i. e., स्वद्रोष्टिकमपेक्ष. 2 That it should be deliberate or अहान and not due to actual error. 3 That it should be between things having similarity, and so based on similarity. 4 That it should be striking or pictures-que. 5 And that it should concern itself with the म or मम and इय or व्यापार of the thing under discussion. Regarding this last requirement Prathārendurāya observes (p. 44) अन्यथमपि द्वा गूण । माधस्वमावस्तु क्रिया । इति ननु वि । ४४-४५-४६-४७-४८-४९-५०-५१-५२-५३-५४-५५-५६-५७-५८-५९-६०-६१-६२-६३-६४-६५-६६-६७-६८-६९-७०-७१-७२-७३-७४-७५-७६-७७-७८-७९-८०-८१-८२-८३-८४-८५-८६-८७-८८-८९-९०-९१-९२-९३-९४-९५-९६-९७-९८-९९-१००-१०१-१०२-१०३-१०४-१०५-१०६-१०७-१०८-१०९-११०-१११-११२-११३-११४-११५-११६-११७-११८-११९-१२०-१२१-१२२-१२३-१२४-१२५-१२६-१२७-१२८-१२९-१३०-१३१-१३२-१३३-१३४-१३५-१३६-१३७-१३८-१३९-१४०-१४१-१४२-१४३-१४४-१४५-१४६-१४७-१४८-१४९-१५०-१५१-१५२-१५३-१५४-१५५-१५६-१५७-१५८-१५९-१६०-१६१-१६२-१६३-१६४-१६५-१६६-१६७-१६८-१६९-१७०-१७१-१७२-१७३-१७४-१७५-१७६-१७७-१७८-१७९-१८०-१८१-१८२-१८३-१८४-१८५-१८६-१८७-१८८-१८९-१९०-१९१-१९२-१९३-१९४-१९५-१९६-१९७-१९८-१९९-२००-२०१-२०२-२०३-२०४-२०५-२०६-२०७-२०८-२०९-२१०-२११-२१२-२१३-२१४-२१५-२१६-२१७-२१८-२१९-२२०-२२१-२२२-२२३-२२४-२२५-२२६-२२७-२२८-२२९-२३०-२३१-२३२-२३३-२३४-२३५-२३६-२३७-२३८-२३९-२४०-२४१-२४२-२४३-२४४-२४५-२४६-२४७-२४८-२४९-२५०-२५१-२५२-२५३-२५४-२५५-२५६-२५७-२५८-२५९-२६०-२६१-२६२-२६३-२६४-२६५-२६६-२६७-२६८-२६९-२७०-२७१-२७२-२७३-२७४-२७५-२७६-२७७-२७८-२७९-२८०-२८१-२८२-२८३-२८४-२८५-२८६-२८७-२८८-२८९-२९०-२९१-२९२-२९३-२९४-२९५-२९६-२९७-२९८-२९९-३००-३०१-३०२-३०३-३०४-३०५-३०६-३०७-३०८-३०९-३१०-३११-३१२-३१३-३१४-३१५-३१६-३१७-३१८-३१९-३२०-३२१-३२२-३२३-३२४-३२५-३२६-३२७-३२८-३२९-३३०-३३१-३३२-३३३-३३४-३३५-३३६-३३७-३३८-३३९-३४०-३४१-३४२-३४३-३४४-३४५-३४६-३४७-३४८-३४९-३५०-३५१-३५२-३५३-३५४-३५५-३५६-३५७-३५८-३५९-३६०-३६१-३६२-३६३-३६४-३६५-३६६-३६७-३६८-३६९-३७०-३७१-३७२-३७३-३७४-३७५-३७६-३७७-३७८-३७९-३८०-३८१-३८२-३८३-३८४-३८५-३८६-३८७-३८८-३८९-३९०-३९१-३९२-३९३-३९४-३९५-३९६-३९७-३९८-३९९-४००-४०१-४०२-४०३-४०४-४०५-४०६-४०७-४०८-४०९-४१०-४११-४१२-४१३-४१४-४१५-४१६-४१७-४१८-४१९-४२०-४२१-४२२-४२३-४२४-४२५-४२६-४२७-४२८-४२९-४३०-४३१-४३२-४३३-४३४-४३५-४३६-४३७-४३८-४३९-४४०-४४१-४४२-४४३-४४४-४४५-४४६-४४७-४४८-४४९-४५०-४५१-४५२-४५३-४५४-४५५-४५६-४५७-४५८-४५९-४६०-४६१-४६२-४६३-४६४-४६५-४६६-४६७-४६८-४६९-४७०-४७१-४७२-४७३-४७४-४७५-४७६-४७७-४७८-४७९-४८०-४८१-४८२-४८३-४८४-४८५-४८६-४८७-४८८-४८९-४९०-४९१-४९२-४९३-४९४-४९५-४९६-४९७-४९८-४९९-५००-५०१-५०२-५०३-५०४-५०५-५०६-५०७-५०८-५०९-५१०-५११-५१२-५१३-५१४-५१५-५१६-५१७-५१८-५१९-५२०-५२१-५२२-५२३-५२४-५२५-५२६-५२७-५२८-५२९-५३०-५३१-५३२-५३३-५३४-५३५-५३६-५३७-५३८-५३९-५४०-५४१-५४२-५४३-५४४-५४५-५४६-५४७-५४८-५४९-५५०-५५१-५५२-५५३-५५४-५५५-५५६-५५७-५५८-५५९-५६०-५६१-५६२-५६३-५६४-५६५-५६६-५६७-५६८-५६९-५७०-५७१-५७२-५७३-५७४-५७५-५७६-५७७-५७८-५७९-५८०-५८१-५८२-५८३-५८४-५८५-५८६-५८७-५८८-५८९-५९०-५९१-५९२-५९३-५९४-५९५-५९६-५९७-५९८-५९९-६००-६०१-६०२-६०३-६०४-६०५-६०६-६०७-६०८-६०९-६१०-६११-६१२-६१३-६१४-

(iii) Numerous subdivisions of this figure are given by *Ātaulakṛika*. compare *Ātamkārasaṁvāsa* (p. 57).


Rasagangādhara (pp 233-87), and especially Pratīpa-
rudriya (p. 386) We can exhibit them in a tabular
form thus—



Further subdivisions of each of these varieties are as
under—



The four main divisions of शब्दा are in this way divi-
sible into 8 sub-varieties thus giving rise to a total
of 32 varieties under शब्दा. Each of these varieties
can be further sub-divided into three sorts thus—



Thus we have—

शब्दा आतिविद्या	of	24	varieties
शब्दा गुणविद्या	of	24	varieties
शब्दा क्रियाविद्या	of	24	varieties
शब्दा द्रव्यविद्या	of	8	varieties (३० निमिषा १० निमिषा ३० निमिषा १० निमिषा)
प्रतीयमाना आतिविद्या	of	12	varieties (३० निमिषा १० निमिषा ३० निमिषा १० निमिषा)

प्रतीयमाना गुणविषया of 12 varieties;
 प्रतीयमाना क्रियाविषया of 12 varieties;
 प्रतीयमाना द्रव्यविषया of 4 varieties;

Total 120 varieties.

Illustrations for all these varieties, especially the प्रतीयमाना varieties, are not always quotable. Jagannātha's criticism of these manifold varieties is also worth quoting. He says (p. 295)—इह जात्यादयो हि भेदाः प्राचामनुसोधादुदाहृताः । यस्तु तान्तेषां चमत्कारे वेलक्ष्यमस्तीत्यनुदाहर्यते । चमत्कारवेलक्षणं पुनर्हेतुकत्वस्वरूपत्वमनानां प्रयाणां प्रकाराणामेव ।

(iv) For the distinction between उपदेश and उपदेशितोपमा compare our Note to II. 23. Bhoja, however, considers (iv. 31) उपदेशोपमा as उपमावर्गोपदेश and says that it is not distinct from उपदेश proper. His example is—

मिथुनव्यपदेशेन नय्या य एवं ।

नय्यावर्गोपदेशोपमावर्गोपदेश इति ।

नय व्यापदेशोपदेश इति । उपमावर्गोपदेशोपमावर्गोपदेश इति ।
 This however is distinct from the उपमा variety recognised by Hanan.

(v) As to उपदेशोपमा being उपमा compare our Notes to II. 23.

Notes to II. 26-28. (i) This famous discussion of the 'वर्णन' stanza which has been taken over from our author by most subsequent writers such as Ruyyaka, Marimata, Vāṇanātha, Jagannātha, etc., raises certain side issues which we shall first dispose of. Daṇḍin refers to this stanza as having been already, before his days, the subject of discussion. It cannot therefore be of his own composition, and he cannot be reasonably supposed to have been the author of the work from which the stanza is taken. The next question is to determine the source of the quotation. Until the discovery of Dharmas [Dardra-]Chārudatta all were content to assign the Mṛicchhakaṭika I. 31 as the source for Dardra, but there are reasons to suppose that the Mṛicchhakaṭika is itself an elaboration of the Chārudatta stanza. Compare a paper on the subject

read by me before the First Oriental Conference held at Poona, 1912), and this leaves it an open question as to whether Dandin was indebted to Śūdraka or to Bhāsa. Exact grounds are lacking for determining the question one way or the other; but as much we have gained by the discovery of Bhāsa's plays; we need not any more link the date of Dandin to that of Śūdraka. (or of Bhāsa) If Śūdraka is to be assigned, say to cir. 600 A. D., and if reasons exist to assign Dandin to an earlier date, we can do so by making him refer to Bhāsa who gives our stanza in Chāradatta I. 19 as well as in Bālacharita I. 13. If on the other hand Bhāsa turns out to be a ninth-century play-wright (I have seen this only asserted but not actually proved or even made probable) and if Dandin comes earlier, we can still preserve our countenance and make Dandin borrow from Śūdraka. Dandin here quotes the first half of the stanza. One of our Mss. quotes the full stanza in this place and gives besides another extra stanza which is noticed in the Chitrasmṛtīśā (p. 77). The full stanza is repeated also as (ii. 362) which we regard as an interpolation (see Note to the stanza).

(ii) The word *तु* is used in उन्मा as well as उन्मत्त. Compare Note (x) to ii. 14. In the latter half of II. 227 Dandin is actually quoting the words of Patañjali. See our Sanskrit Commentary.

(iii) The पूर्वार्थ in II. 228-229 can be thus exhibited. The stanza लिप्यति नमो ह्यति contains an उन्मा with—

उन्मान—लिप्यति	}	१० तमस उपप्रसरत् सेतमिष ।
उन्मत्त—नमः		
साधारणार्थ—सेत		
वचन—इव		

Here of course one word is made to perform two functions, which is obviously a mistake.

(iv) In the above पूर्वार्थ the verb लिप्यति was interpreted as सेतमिषात्तर following the usual practice of the Vākyasāras or Grammarians. According to them

लिप्ति - अमुककृतं-अमुककर्म-लेखनव्यापार Now we have seen that we cannot make the व्यापार the उपमान. Can we make the simile turn upon the subordinate elements of the व्यापार, the कृतं and the कर्म? This is the point considered in II. 230. The answer is in the negative; for if the व्यापारप्रधान interpretation of लिप्ति is to be retained, the गौण factors are lost in the principal and can have no independent locus standi. This is quite obvious.

(v) The पुरस्स in II. 231 suggests that, following the Naiyāyikas, we should so interpret the verb लिप्ति as to give a non-subordinate position to the कृतं of the लेखनकिया. In this view लिप्ति=अमुक[कर्म]वृत्तिप्रत्यय-लेखनकृतवृत्तिमान्-कर्ता. So the proposed उपमा statement is—

उपमान—लिप्तिरन्तां or लेख

उपमेय—नमसु

साधारणधर्म—

वाचक—द्व

Now the question is, who is the लेख? If the idea is दया कथितं पुरा [श्रीम] लिप्तिरन्तां नमः अहानि लिप्ति, we obviously can connect अहानि with the उपमेय alone and not with the उपमान also, whereas, as a matter of fact, अहानि seems to be intended in the stanza as going with both. Hence Das Up. २४२—अहानि न मरदम् (or adopting the variant which also has good authority—मग्न अहानि न मरदम्). Further the point of similarity between the proposed उपमान and उपमेय (or, adopting the variant, the point in which the उपमेय is compared with the लेख the उपमान has got to be extraneously supplied it is not actually given in the stanza.

(vi) Can we not as a possible alternative, connect अहानि with both the उपमान and the उपमेय proposed in (v) above, and in this manner—दया कथितं पुरा अहानि लिप्ति (or लिप्ति) नमः अहानि लिप्ति. This would obviate the first difficulty of अहानि न मरदम्, but the second difficulty still remains. We can, it is true, conceivably imagine मरदम् or some such characteristic of the लेख as the supposed common dharma, but it is fit and

prekehā knows of no such limitations. At the same time, while a simile is a more or less sustained effort of the imagination to hold two things together in one consciousness with a view to establish a complete picture, an *Ūprekahā* is a passing suggestion of the intended similarity, which may occasionally be very picturesque and which, while it lasts, gives a point of view from which the poet wishes us to understand the fact, the quality, or the action described. Hence we would render the word by Poetic-Conception.

Notes to II, 235—(i) The three figures हेतु, मृम, and लेख, and in this order, are enumerated by Bhāmaha (II 86) who however says—हेतुश्च मृमो लेखो नालंकारयोः मतः ।, the view of Dandin being just the contrary. The question about the chronological relation between the two writers cannot be settled either way on the strength of this circumstance alone. Compare, however, Notes to 244 below. Other writers who recognise all these three figures by these names are भोज (III 12, III 21, IV 56), शङ्कर (VII 82, VII 98, VII 100), राजशेखर (p 43), and कुल्लुभानन्द (stanzas 166, 150, 137). Others recognise one or two of them only, subsuming the remaining under some other figure or figures. Dandin illustrates *Hetu* in II 236-259, defines and illustrates *Sukehma* in II 260-264, and treats of *Lessa* in II 265-272.

(ii) *Hetu* is a poetic cause, and Indian *Alamkārikas* recognise a number of figures of speech based upon causal relation. These are (cp. Note (i) to II, 2 also)—अर्थान्तरव्याप (II 169), विभावना (II 199), समर्पित (II 298), विशेषोक्ति (II 373), निदर्शन (II 348),—amongst the *alamkāras* recognised by Dandī—as also the *alamkāras* known as वाच्योक्ति, अनुमान, कारणमात्रा, अहेतु, विराम, विविध, समुच्चय, समर्पित, व्यापन, अर्थगति, etc., not to mention *alamkāras* like रत्नानुसारा, or मुख्योक्ति (where similarity serves to illustrate as well as to corroborate), or some sub-varieties like वचनोक्ति or Mammaṣa's last variety of अनिरूपोक्ति (where causal relation comes in only secondarily)

Ignoring the last two groups of alamkāras, and considering first the alamkāras not found in the Kāvya-darsa, it is to be noted that समाधि-समाहित, Dandin preserving the first word for the *गुण* and the second for the alamkāra. Writers like Bhoja (III. 34, iv 44), Ruyyaka (p. 163, p. 189), and Viśvanātha (x. 86, x. 96), it is true, recognise both समाधि and समाहित as two distinct alamkāras, but the समाहित of the last two writers is a समावेष्टार, while we have already commented upon Bhoja's Samādhī as an alamkāra (see Note (ii) to II. 99). About समुच्चय we shall have something to say in the Notes to II. 298, while कारणमात्र is only the हेतु with सदसल्लवेति super-added. The figure भेदेतु as recognised by Bhoja (III. 18), Rudrata (ix. 34), and वाग्भट (p. 44) comes very near to our author's विवेकोक्ति (II. 323). The figure वाच्यलिङ्ग (defined by Memmaka as हेतोर्बोद्धव्यार्थता) is practically the same as Dandin's हेतु, while अनुमान is the same हेतु set forth with the usual व्याप्ति and other paraphernalia of a logical inference. For the rest compare Notes (i) to (vi) to II. 169. The other figures need not be here considered in details. See however Notes on निप्रदेतु varieties.

(iii) Dandin has given illustrations for 16 varieties of हेतु of which 14 are illustrations of कारणहेतु and only 2 (viz. II. 244, II. 245) are of the शङ्कहेतु. We have already (p. 127 above) explained the distinction between कारण and शङ्क हेतु, from which it will be clear that the कारणहेतु (e. g. वदति) normally precedes the कार्य (धूम), while the शङ्क is the logical mark or लिङ्ग (e. g. धूम) which in its most solid form is actually the कार्य of the शङ्कवस्तु (viz. वदति). But a poetic शङ्क need not always have that rigorous validity in its व्याप्ति which logic requires. For instance in II. 245 the व्याप्ति—यत्र इन्द्रकादावाप्यवन्दनामममामायथ देहोमा नत्र कामानुत्थम—may conceivably be vitiated in a particular person who is restless, but not by love. It is only if the शङ्क is the कार्य of the शङ्क that the व्याप्ति is invariably valid.

(iv) An *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, as we have seen above (p 123), involves a *साध्यसाधन* relation between two things or *वस्तु*. Now although it is true that the most valid form of proof is the one that depends at each stage upon demonstrable causal relation between one thing and another, we are not always so rigorously exacting in ordinary life and much less so in poetry. Even analogy is often given and accepted as valid proof. Generally, however, the *साध्य* and the *साधन* are related as particular to universal, or vice versa. The particular is the result of the universal by deduction, while the universal is the result of the particular by induction. In *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, accordingly, the causal relation between the two statements (even where it is demonstrable) is ignored and attention is fixed upon the *समर्थनमर्थक* relation between them. In a *हेतु*, even in the *शपक* variety, the causal relation is naturally what comes to the fore, and as the two *वस्तु*s in question are normally two particular objects (e. g. *ऊसा* and *राम* in II 245) and not two statements as in an *अर्थान्तरन्यास*, the distinction between that figure and *शपकहेतु* is generally not very difficult to make.

(v) Some important definitions of *हेतु* are given below —

Agnipurāṇa (344.29-32)—

मिथ्यापिपित्तार्थस्य हेतुर्भवति साधकः ।
कारको शपक इति द्विधा सोऽयमज्ञायते ॥

Bhūja (III 12)—

क्रियायाः कारणं हेतुः कारको शपकश्च यः ।
अभावार्थप्रहेतुश्च अनुक्तिश्च इदेष्यते ॥

Vāgbhata (iv 105)—

यत्रोपपादयन् केचिदर्धं वस्तु प्रकाशयते ।
तत्रोपपादयुक्तिरसौ हेतुश्चोक्तो कथं तथा ॥

Rudrata (vii. 82)—

हेतुमता सह हेनोरभिपानमभेदहृद्भवेत्तत्र ।

सोलंकारो हेतुः स्यादन्वेयः पृथग्भूतः ॥

Vāgbhata (p. 43)—

कार्यकारणयोरेव हेतुः ।

Viśvanātha (x. 64)—

अभेदेनाभिपानं हेतुहेनोर्हेतुमता सह ।

Kuvalayanānda (stanzas 166-167)—

हेनोर्हेतुमता सार्धं वर्णने हेतुव्यपत्तेः ।

.....

हेतुहेतुमनोरसं हेतुं केचित् प्रवक्ष्यते ।

(vi) Of these definitions while the first two and the first given by the Kuvalayanāndakāra agree with that of Dandin, the others is distinctly noticeable an attempt to give a special definition to the figure besides the mere fact of one thing being the हेतु of another. Bhāmaha, it will be remembered, had already raised his voice against the recognition of हेतु as a distinct figure in as much as there was no वचोक्तप्रतिपान in it at all; and this criticism has so much weighed upon later Ālankārikas that even so astute a writer as Jagannātha questions the validity of वाच्यलिङ्ग (which with these later writers does duty for हेतु) as a distinct figure-of-speech. The view is thus set forth and criticised by Viśvesvara (p. 340 f.)—यत्तु [रसगङ्गाधरे]—वाच्यलिङ्गं नालंकारः कविप्रतिभाभिर्मित्यन्यत्पुनश्चमत्कारविशेषत्वमपि चिह्नित्विरिहात् । हेतु-हेतुमद्राज्यं लोकमिदंवात् । श्रेयसिदंमिषयजन्यत्वं चमत्कारः श्रेयस्युपेक्षात् तदसंख्येयत्वान्नारतां चक्ष्यति ननु वाच्यलिङ्गं तद्व्यवस्थेयमन्वयात्तन्त्राभावादिति सत्तुच्यम् । लोकिह्येव कविप्रतिभायाप्रजन्यतया चमत्कारजन्यत्वात् । ... । एवमुपमादेरप्यलंकारार्थं न स्यात् सादृश्यस्य वास्तव्येन कविप्रतिभाकल्पितत्वं विहात् ।

(vii) The sixteen varieties of Hetu illustrated by Dandin are exhibited in the following Tabular statement. Bhoja has elaborated Dandin's own scheme

Notes to II. 235-237—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—नोयं मथोक्तो मन्वदमन्त्रः प्रत्युपपन्नक्रियागमनेनात् प्रवर्तको नाम कारकदेवभेदः ।

Notes to II. 238-239—(i) Bhoja thus explains the illustration—अथैवैवियस्य एतन्मय एयिह्यमप्यगाधनक्रियायां कर्तृत्वेनावेशादि-वर्तको नामाय कारकदेवभेदः ।

(ii) In II. 239^d the reading अथेवैव, as being the *lectio difficilior* and as yielding a very good sense has to be naturally preferred to the other variants available.

Notes to II. 240—(i) The threefold division of कर्म here given by Dandin is also to be found in the *Vākya-pāṭya* of Bhojarāhari (III. 45-88, कर्मविचार), some pertinent stanzas from the section being—

निर्लेख्यं च विकार्यं च प्राप्यं च त्रिविधं मन्त्रम् ।
तदेष्टितन्मं कर्म कर्तुर्मान्वात् कल्पितम् ॥ ४५ ॥
औदासीन्येन यत् प्राप्तं यच्च कर्तुर्नोचितम् ।
तद्वान्मरणात्म्यात् यत्तत्प्राप्यमप्युक्तम् ॥ ४६ ॥
सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी ।
मम्य साध्यायते तस्य निर्लेख्यं प्रवर्तते ॥ ४७ ॥
प्रकृतेस्तु निवृत्त्यां विद्यते कथिदन्वया ।
निर्लेख्यं च विकार्यं च कर्म साधं प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ४८ ॥
यद्यप्यवयते सत्ता जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते ।
तन्निर्लेख्यं विकार्यं च कर्म द्वेषा व्यावस्थितम् ॥ ४९ ॥
प्रकृत्युत्पत्तिदत्तं विविक्त्यादिभिरमव्ययम् ।
विनिष्कृतान्तरोत्तरायां कृत्योद्विक्त्याम् ॥ ५० ॥
विद्याकृतविशेषाणां निदिर्लेख्यं न मम्यते ।
यथोपायनुमानाद्वा तत् प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ ५१ ॥
विशेषलाभं सर्वत्र विद्यते दर्शनादिना ।
केदाचित् तदभिव्यक्तिमिदिराष्टविधादि ॥ ५२ ॥
यथा वैकर्मपादानं साधने भेदेन दर्शितम् ।
तथैवमेव कर्मोपि भेदेन प्रतिरुद्धितम् ॥ ५३ ॥
निर्लेख्यं वा विकार्यं वा प्राप्यं वा साधनाधरः ।
क्रियागमेव साध्यायत् निद्विष्टोक्तिरीयते ॥ ५४ ॥

(ii) Professor K. B. Pathak (Ind. Ant. NLI, Oct. 19 p. 237) has argued that this three-fold division of कर्म
१। [Kavyādarśa]

Notes to II. 241-245—(i) In II. 212 the forests have been transformed into poison. A *visar* involves a change of form and quality, the inner substance remaining the same.

(ii) Bhoja has given IL 243 as an illustration of what he calls प्रयोगः दिशन्विद्ये हेतुः । For explanation see *Sarasvatikanthābhāraṇa*, p. 274 f.

(iii) Dandin has given for प्राप्यकर्म an illustration that depends upon our understanding the doctrine of इन्द्रियानां प्राप्यकारिता. A straight-forward illustration would have used an ordinary verb of motion. This he has done in IL 244; only, mere statements like "birds are repairing unto their nests" have no poetry if interpreted wholly and solely as containing the statement of a प्राप्यकर्म. Bhāmaha criticises such bald or unpoetic statements in the following words (IL 87)—

गतोऽस्मिहो भतीन्मुखांति क्षमाव दक्षिण ।
इदमेवादि किं कार्यं क्षतामेवा प्रवर्तते ॥

(iv) Here an interesting chronological question has been raised. Is Dandin by his words—गतोऽस्मि साधेर (IL 244)—expressing his dissent from Bhāmaha's unjust condemnation of the *क्षमा*, or is Bhāmaha criticising Dandin by refusing to allow as poetry what Dandin gives as good poetry. At first blush both views seem to be equally correct, but it seems to us that if one of the two writers is quoting the other at all, it is Bhāmaha who is criticising Dandin, though it is possible that the verse was one of the floating traditional lines—like many another in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*—which had been made the object of exposition by several *Ālankārikas* before them. Dandin, we think, gives it as his opinion that the line is unpoetic, and so is not an illustration of कारकहेतु with प्राप्यकर्म. But it can be a good कारकहेतु for indicating the time. Mammata thus brings out the suggestion about the *क्षमावस्था* (P. 290)—गतोऽस्मिहो इत्यतः सर्वत्र प्राप्यकारकव्यवहार इति अभिव्यक्त्युपपत्त्यतमिति प्राप्तप्राप्यस्य प्रेक्षयितुं कर्मव्यवहारमिवान्वये इति साध्या विविधव्यवहारमिति इति मा गा इति मुख्यतो दूरे प्रवेशवन्तमिति सन्नेषुना न

भक्त्या विवेकपूर्णं गद्यं कथमिति नामनेत्यादि अत्र भक्त्या विवेकपूर्णं गद्यं तत्र प्रतिभक्तिः ।

(v) Dandin uses the words *प्रत्यक्षं गद्यं* to explain why he has not taken a regular verb implying motion as his illustration for *प्रत्यक्षं*. A mere motion as that of birds to their nests has no *प्रत्यक्षं* if understood as an illustration of a *प्रत्यक्षं* with *प्रत्यक्षं*. But, says he, the instance can be a good illustration for a *प्रत्यक्षं*. After this Dandin proceeds to give a regular example of a *प्रत्यक्षं* in IL 245. Similarly Bhāmaha can be understood as criticising the line in question even as the illustration of a *प्रत्यक्षं*. It then becomes mere *वृत्ति*, mere report of the weather, and hence void of any *alamkāra*. The chronological relation between Dandin and Bhāmaha cannot in any case be made to rest upon the doubtful testimony of this passage alone.

Notes to IL 246-252—(i) Bhoja quotes from Dandin stanzas II 247, 248, 249, 250 and 251. His comments on these are II 247—अथ विद्यान्-अथाह प्रत्यक्षं गद्यं व्यासनादिद्वारणम् । IL 248—अथ कामकभीष्मादगमनादि प्रत्यक्षं गद्यं पुष्पाभ्रानुसृजानकारणम् (with the variant गद्यं for गद्यं) II 249—अथ वानि भवन्ति न दृष्टान्तिरेव नरनराभाव्य मन प्रमोदकारणम् । II 250—अथानालोचनवेष्टितमालम्बनं विभूतीना निविनमद्विदुः (with the variants नेयु for तेषां and निविन for विभूतीना) II 251—अथ वस्तुन उपादः प्रत्यक्षं गद्यं इत्यर्थः । तेन नृपस्य भवणासुष्टेयस्य दारिद्र्यनारीणां मरणे कारणम् । For a more accurate explanation of the last illustration see our Sanskrit commentary IL 251'. The commentary also gives the other three illustrations given by Dandin.

Notes to IL 253-254—(i) A *विग्रह* is a violation of the law of Nature. Hence Dandin suggests that the violation should not be prominently expressed but should be conveyed in a secondary or subdued tone. Otherwise it would be a different figure of speech.

Notes to II. 255—(i) The example given involves only व्यतृप्तदृष्टा; Bhoja gives also an example of बालदृष्टा in the verse अनाध्वनेन etc. quoted by us in our Sanskrit commentary to II. 255

(ii) Several writers who do not recognise Hetu as a distinct alamkāra designate the व्यतृप्तिरूप between कथं and कथं as a distinct figure-of-speech known as असंगति. Mammata thus defines it (p. 869)—

निवेदितकालने कार्यकारणभूतयोः ।

दुग्धपदमस्योद्यत्त एवमिति वा व्यासयोगतिः ॥

explaining the point thus in his Vṛtt—इह ददेत् कार्यं तदेतन्नेव कार्यमस्यभूतम् एवम् यथा भूयति । यत्र तु देवदत्तः कार्यं भवति तत्र कार्यमस्यभूतम् एवम् यथा भूयति । यत्र तु देवदत्तः कार्यं भवति तत्र कार्यमस्यभूतम् एवम् यथा भूयति ।

Notes to II. 256—(i) A more familiar example of this variety is—

(ii) A figure-of-speech called विहित and defined in the *वृत्त्यमन्द* (131) as—विहितं परस्परान्वयानुः सादृश्येतिम् । is very difficult to distinguish from गुह्य. The *अद्विवाचर* thus defines the distinction (ibid. p. 191)—सुमावर्तसरे परा-
 however, विहित
 (13) defines it
 Rudrata on
 the other hand defines it as

यथातिप्रसन्नता गुह्य. गमनान्वितप्रसन्नताम् ।
 अर्थात्तरं विद्वद्वादिभिर्नमसि तत् विहितम् ॥

Notes to II. 265-267—(i) In गुह्य there is the discovery of the hidden thing, but not disclosure. In लेख (No 1) there is (a) a concealing, (b) a discovery leading to imminent disclosure, and (c) an attempt to prevent the disclosure under some other pretext. This figure is known in other writers as व्याजोक्ति defined by Rudrata (p. 174) as—उद्भिन्नवस्तुनिर्गूढम् and by Vivvanatha (x 92) as—व्याजोक्तिर्गोपने व्याजोक्तिरित्यादि वस्तुन । Vāmana's definition (iv 3. 25)—व्याजस्य गन्तव्यार्थं व्याजोक्तिः is tantamount to the same thing.

(ii) This figure has to be distinguished from अपह्नुति (ii 306). As will be clear from Dandin's definition of the latter figure (cp also Note (iii) to ii 95) he does not regard गम्य as the invariable basis of an अपह्नुति, and so the usual distinction between these two figures cannot be stated as it is generally stated by commentators—गम्यवृत्तकालहर्षोपह्नुति । अथ (i e व्याजोक्ति) or लेखी तु न गम्यविवरोति श्रेयः । We can perhaps formulate the distinction between them by saying that in an अपह्नुति neither the thing negated nor the thing asserted is anything like subtle or mysterious. In लेख the subtlety of the thing constitutes the very essence of the figure.

(iii) Vāmana's example for the figure is—

सत्त्वमसि (v. 1. १) अथवा अहोरेण कदाचिदेव अस्मिनि ।
 कदाचिदेव अहोरेण अस्मिनि इत्यम् (v. 1. २) ॥

Notes to II. 275—(i) Dandin now defines together a group of three *Ālamkāras* known as रमालंकारः. Bhāmaha (iii. 1-7) and Udbhata (p. 49, generally following Bhāmaha in his treatment) are alone amongst ancient writers to recognise these three *ālamkāras* in the sense in which Dandin understands them. Ruyyaka (P. 185), Viśvanātha (x. 95-96) and one or two later writers accept these *ālamkāras* and even add to their number the *ālamkāras* designated as *Samāhita*, *Bhāvodaya*, *Bhāvasamdhī*, and *Bhāvasabalāsa* (see Kuvalayanandachandrikā on stanzas 169f), but they have radically altered the nature of these figures in as much as they require that in these figures the रस, भाव, etc ought to be introduced in subordination to another वाक्यार्थ and not prominently and for their own sake. This view was first propounded by the author of the *अनिकारिका* (cp II. 5, p. 71)—

प्रधानेन्यत्र वाक्यार्थे यत्राह तु रसादयः ।

काव्ये तस्मिन्प्रलंकारो रमादिरिति मे मतिः ॥

Ānandavardhana's *Āloka* on this *kārikā* runs as follows —यत्रापि रसवदनेरसस्यान्यैर्देहिनी विदयस्तदापि यस्मिन् काव्ये प्रधानतया न्येयो वाक्यार्थो भूतस्तस्य चाद्भुता ये रसादयस्तो रसादेर्लंकारव्यविदय इति मामहीन पक्षः । Dandin, Bhāmaha, or some predecessor of them is perhaps intended to be alluded to in the *kārikā* in question: Abhinavagupta in his *ध्वन्यालोक* alludes to the passage actually mentions Bhāmaha. Our Sanskrit Commentary on II. 275 lines 123ff. quotes Premachandra's attempt to defend the position taken by Dandin and Bhāmaha as against the new school.

(ii) We have explained in a general way in our Note (i) to § 18 the nature of *Rasa*, but it is necessary to afford a detailed exposition of the theory of *Rasas* in all its bearings. Poetry consists of two elements—words and sense (ignoring the question of their relative prominence). Now there are excellences and defects belonging to words and to sense, and these are treated at great length in the works of the earlier *Ālamkārikas*. They were considered as character-

letice inherent in the "body" of poetry. Dandin calls them *guṇas* or life-breaths (I. 42). And as a body can have extraneous ornaments to set forth its natural charm so poetry also had its "ornaments" or *alamkāras*, these being specific turns of expression or thought which could not be covered by the usual *guṇa* (and *śīlās*). For a time advance in the science of Poetics consisted mainly in an elaboration of the *guṇa* and *śīlās*, their number and mutual distinction. The next step of importance taken was the formulation of the doctrine of *śīlās* or styles. It was probably discovered that certain schools, courts, or literary circles developed only specific *guṇas* and *alamkāras* to the exclusion of others; and as these originally were confined to definite territorial divisions the styles cultivated by them got the nicknames of *veśāṁ*, *śīlā*, *prāsa*, etc. This may have led to emulation which in time degenerated into jealousy and animosity, and the ultimate compromise effected only ended in the doctrine that all the *śīlās* had each an element of good and of evil in it.

(III) All this time however no attempt was made to explain why certain *guṇas* or *śīlās* afford pleasure more than others. A mere external labelling and classification was naturally felt to be inadequate in a science of Aesthetics. Help was sought at first from the sister science of Dramaturgy. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* had led down the Sūtra—*विशेषगुणव्यभिचारीभावोत्पत्तिरिति* (Adhyāya vi, p. 62, where this ancient theory is quoted and explained). The generating and intensifying factors (*bhāva* and *prāsa* *śīlās*) are *śīlā*, *prāsa*, etc. and *śīlā*, *prāsa* *śīlās*, etc. And they produce in a *guṇa* etc. in the first place one or more of the *śīlās* *śīlās*, which are somewhat involuntary and physiological in origin, and along with them a number of psychological moods or feelings through which the hero passes. These latter are some of them dominant feelings or *śīlās* of which there are five enumerated, and some, concurrent feelings or *śīlās*.

which no less than 33 are enumerated. The अनुभाव, स्वाधिभाव and व्यभिचारिभाव together make up the 49 (50) kinds of भाव, and these भाव, belonging to राम, दुष्कर्म, etc. (or to the actors representing them), called into existence by definite "factors," produce in the audience by sympathy the nine रस or sentiments. This is the theory of the Nāṭyaśāstra which can be graphically thus presented:—

आलम्बन उद्दीपन	{	विभाव produce	{	8 सात्विक अनुभाव	{	produce 8(9)
		(in Actor)		8 (9) स्वाधिभाव		रस
				33 व्यभिचारिभाव		(in Audience)

The eight अनुभाव are enumerated in our Sanskrit Com ii. 275⁷²⁻⁷⁸, the स्वाधिभाव in ii 275⁷⁹⁻⁸², and व्यभिचारिभाव in ii. 275⁸³⁻⁹⁰. The eight (or nine) रस correspond to the nine स्वाधिभाव—

रति to श्रद्धा	क्रोध to रोद	जुगुप्सा to शोभन
हान to शय	उन्माद to शी	विस्मय to अद्भुत
शोक to व्रण	भय to भयानक	निर्वेद to शान्त

(iv) Dandin is aware of the existence of the रस theory (cp i 51, ii 280, iii 170, and especially the last passage) but he did not know how to organically incorporate it with his theory of Poetics. Accordingly he merely gives a recognition to the रस theory by introducing a new variety of अलंकार for cases where the रस for their own sake were pre-eminently developed in a poem which was otherwise devoid of the usual गुण or मन्त्र. The रस comes in for recognition also in connection with Dandin's treatment of मन्त्र (L 51). This was merely borrowing a feather from the sister science. Rāsa is of the nature of an inner consciousness (hence called अन्तरा), and it is evident that it can be felt even in poems not containing the रसः alamkāra. Some Alamkārika, as we saw, tried to get out of the problem by recognising रसः alamkāra only in those cases where the रस is felt as being subordinated to the रसार्थ proper.

(v) The real solution of the matter came from the grammarians. If poetry consists of words having specific sense (or words and action), it is necessary to

determine at first the varieties of sense or *artha*. There is the expressed sense or the *vaçyārtha* and the figurative or indicative sense or *laksyārtha*. In the stock instance गङ्गा means literally and primarily the stream, which is the *vaçyārtha*. But in statements like गङ्गायां प्रामः the word must mean not the stream but the bank. This is the secondary significance of the word or its *laksyārtha*. Now why should a person be prompted to say गङ्गायां प्रामः instead of गङ्गानटे प्रामः? Clearly there must be a प्रयोजन (ignoring for the moment the few cases where *स्ति* overpowers it), and this was discovered to be the intention to bring out the *देव्य*, *पावन्य*, and other qualities inherent in the प्राम by reason of its proximity to the stream. The प्रयोजन of a लक्षणा is therefore the व्यङ्ग्य sense. In cases like the above where the *vaçy* and the *laksy* senses can be clearly distinguished from the व्यङ्ग्य sense there is no difficulty of any kind. But there are cases where the व्यङ्ग्य is अर्गलक्ष्यम्; where the statement as a whole brings in a subtle suggestion without our being able to locate it as resulting from some specific word or words, and all *rasa* could now come in under the अर्गलक्ष्यमव्यङ्ग्यम्.

(vi) One inevitable consequence of the share which the grammarians had in the formulation of the *ध्वनि* theory was the adoption of their *rasa* theory by the *Alaukārikas*. Anandavardhana in his *Nṛ-siṃh* (p. 47-48) clearly recognises this indebtedness. He says—प्रवक्षे हि विदुषो वेदावस्था व्याकरणशुद्ध्याय गर्भविज्ञानम् । ते च श्रुतमात्रेषु शब्देषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति । तत्रैवायं लक्षणानुगतिरिति सूचयति वाच्यत्वसंबन्धेति । सिद्धीन्पुनस्तत्त्वमिति सादृश्या बाधयति । व्यङ्ग्यत्वसंबन्धे व्यवहारमात्राध्वनि-सिद्धयः । In other words—

वेदाः call *रास* शब्द, as being the व्यङ्ग्य of शब्द (to which *गङ्गायां* sounds are subordinate),

आलेः call *रास* शब्द—ध्वनि, as being the व्यङ्ग्य of व्यङ्ग्य (to which the *वाच्य* sense is subordinate)

This means that there is no *rasa* but only an *अभिप्रेत* of the *rasa*. That is to say, it's gestures and movements of the actor can prevail over you only if you — *hear* and have once experienced feelings and emotions.

country by the Chālukya monarch, Pulakeśin II, about 609 or 610. Pulakeśin was victorious at first, but was later defeated by Narasimhavarman I in 642. A. D. Mahendravarman is reported to have been a Jain originally, and to have been converted to faith in Śiva by a famous Tamil saint. If therefore we can imagine that राजवर्मन् is a poetic variant for महेंद्रवर्मन् or the महेंद्रवर्मन् bore राजवर्मन् as an additional name, we have here all the evidence that we can expect from tradition for placing Dandin at the court of the Pallavas or Kāñohi in the first half of the 7th century. And as the Pallava power was at its height during this very period, their kingdom might have at this time included the old Chera or Kerala country. We may add that the king Vishnuvardhana mentioned in the earlier part of the extract can be the prince Vishnuvardhana who founded, about A. D. 615, the line of the Eastern Chālukyas. Ānandapura the city I am unable to identify.

(iv) The eight forms of manifestation mentioned in II. 278 are of course the same as the अष्टविधा रस्योऽष्टप्रतिभे alluded to by Kālidāsa in the benedictory verse of the Śikuntalā.

Notes to II. 280-281—(i) Dandin is now going to give in succession the illustrations for रसः, a separate one for each.

(ii) Our Ms. N. on a different hand, gives the marginal note identifying रसः with रसवत्तम. Vasavadattā was an Avanti Princess, compare Śvapnavasavadattā V. 5. An interesting question is to determine whether Dandin is referring to Bhāsa. Definite indications are unfortunately lacking. The pretended burning of Vasavadattā at Lavāṇaka is an old story not invented by Bhāsa. Many dramatists besides Bhāsa have worked on the theme. Iśvaravatsarāja is a play later than Ratnavallī (see the account given by Hultsch in Nach K. G. W. Götz, 1881). Abhinavagupta in his Nāṭya-śaṣṭisāgri (Mādhava Śāstra, vol. III, p. 44) speaks of a play

Udbhata (p. 51) adds the extra line—

वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिर्वा गन्त्येनावगमात्मना ॥

Rudrata (vil. 42)

यस्तु विवक्षितस्तुप्रतिपादनसामग्र्यं तस्य ।
यदजनकमजन्यं वा तत्त्वमनं यत् स पर्यायः ॥

Bhoja (iv. 80)—

मित्ये यदुक्तिभट्टिर्यावगते यः स मूर्तिभिः ।
निरुक्ताद्दोषोऽपि सावाद्दोषः पर्याय इति मीयते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. lii)—

गम्यस्यापि भट्टचन्तरेणाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Mammata (Ullasa x. p. 828)—

पर्यायोक्तं त्वा वाच्यवाचक्येन यद्वयः ।

Vāgbhata (iv. 108)—

अनन्तरतया यत्र वाच्यमानेन वाक्येन ।
विवक्षितं प्रतीयेत पर्यायोक्तिरिति तथा ॥

Vāgbhata (p. 36)—

अनिर्वाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तिः ।

Hemachandra (p. 263)—

व्यङ्ग्यव्योक्तिः पर्यायोक्तम् ।

Pratāparudriya (p. 446)—

कारणं गम्यते यत्र प्रत्युक्तं वाच्यवर्णनम् ।
प्रत्युक्तेन संबद्धं तत्र पर्यायोक्तमुच्यते ॥

Ekāṁśa (viii. 29)—

यत्र व्यङ्ग्यवचनो हेतोः वाच्यमर्थमर्थोक्तम् ।
व्याख्यातार्थं मुच्यते यदर्थोक्तं विदुषां तदस्य ॥

Sahityasampradaya (x. 41)

यथावाच्यं यदा भट्टच-वाच्यमर्थोक्तम् ।

Kuvalayaśāstra (17)

यदर्थोक्तं तु वाच्यं यदा भट्टच-वाच्यम् ।

and Jaganatha (p. 409)—

(17) अर्थोक्तं यदा भट्टच-वाच्यं तदर्थोक्तम् ।

others the same rôle that was subsequently assigned to
 जने Jaganātha (p 415) observes on the point as fol-
 lows—अनिवागन् प्राणिनैर्मयतोऽदृष्टप्रभृतिभिः स्वपथेषु कुत्रापि जनिगुणी-
 मृषाद्वयदिगद्वयं न प्रयुज्या इत्येतादौ नैर्मन्यादयो न स्वाक्षिप्त इत्याधुनि-
 कानां शान्त्युक्तिरयुक्ते न यत् समामोक्षव्याजमुल्लेखप्रयुक्तप्रतीमासलंकारनिरूपणेन
 किमनेषि गुणीभूतव्यद्वयभेदाभेदेषु निरुतिताः । अथ सद्योपि अद्वयप्रपञ्चः
 परंपरोक्तमुक्तो निमित्तः । न ह्यनुभूतिमोक्षो बालेनाप्यपहोन्तुं शक्यते । अन्यदि-
 गद्वे च अचक्षुरो न हृतः । न ह्यनपगतानर्थाकारो भवति ।

(v) The sense intended to be conveyed and the
 sense actually expressed by the words used in a Par-
 yyokta (as Dandin understands the figure) are
 both of them प्रयुक्त but they are not therefore of co-
 ordinate or equal importance; and there is not be-
 tween the two any relation of सारस etc., as there is
 in Samānkti (including under the figure अयनुत्पत्तिमा as
 defined by modern writers—see our Note (ii) to II. 205).
 Hence गमांशिक and परंपरोक्त are adequately differentiated
 from one another.

(vi) Bhoja gives (p 457 —

मया विमुक्ता बहिर्य वक्ता अनेकव्याख्यानं सारं सारम् ।
 इदं तदेतौ वदन्ते विचारये कथानिर्द्वयं विप्रा विनिर्द्वये ॥

as an example of निषाद्वय प्रयोग because there is the
 express statement that the friend left the room under
 the pretext of putting back the tale into its case. Our
 verse II 298 he quotes as an example of the वक्ता-
 variety

Notes to II 298 299 — (i) See Note (ii) to II 295. Bha-
 ra, Anupurana Bhamaha (1) that. Rindana and
 Hemachandra do not see within the statement at all
 Ruyyaka Alankara 113 is a variety and term
 within the statement. It is not a variety, but a term
 defining the Bhamaha type.

समामोक्ष-प्रयोगे प्रयोगः प्रयोगः
 अथ समामोक्ष-प्रयोगे प्रयोगः प्रयोगः

1. Bhamaha's illustration of the variety of the
 is a similar concept. The variety of the variety

Rudrata (viii 57)—

अतिमान्यादुपमेयं यस्याममदेव कश्चने सदपि ।
उपमानमेव नदिति च विज्ञेयापहृतिः मेयम् ॥

Vāmana (iv 3 5)—

गमेन वस्तुनान्द्याख्यपोषद्भूतिः ।

Bhoja (iv 41)—

अपहृतिरपहृत्य किञ्चिद्व्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
 ओषम्यकृत्यनोषम्यः चेति गा द्विविधाच्यते ॥

Ruyyaka (p. 50)—

विषयस्यापह्नवेऽपह्नति ।

Mammata (x. p. 735) —

प्रवृत्त यश्चिपिभ्यान्वयत मायते मात्वपह्निः ।

Vagbhata (p. 39) —

प्रकृतस्य सङ्केतापह्नवोपह्वनि ।

Vagbhata (iv 86)—

नैनरेनदिः स्यादिति उपपन्नम् ।
उच्यते यत्र साग्न्यादपह्निर्निर्गते यथा ॥

Kesavamiyā (p. 34)—

निधिद्वयस्य यदन्यावेन्दमान मायहति ।

Hemachandra (p. 281) —

प्रकृताप्रकृताभ्या प्रकृताप्रकृताभ्या

Vidyacharya (p. 380)—

निवि य विषय माह्वान-सामान्य सुपद्धति ।

Vishvanatha (x 38f) —

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥
 ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥
 ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

Jagannath & (p. 178) —

५. नयेच 'ग' व 'क' हे अक्षरे ह्या शब्दांमध्ये आहेत. त्यांच्या नावांवरून त्या शब्दांचा अर्थ काढता येतो. 'ग' म्हणजे 'ग' आणि 'क' म्हणजे 'क'.

Vivekananda (p. 23.)—

49 ଏ ଲେଖକ ଏ ବିଷୟରେ କିଛି କିଛି କହୁଛନ୍ତି ।

and Achutarya (viii 13)—

आरंभमाणां विविधां प्रकृत्यां ॥

in relation and *सुनिश्चिताप्रवेक्षण*, we are required to make an express mention of the two objects compared.

(vi) Though the illustration of a *स्य* (II. 310ff) might offer points of comparison with *सुष्ययोगिता*, the figure *स्य* always turns upon an unmistakable peculiarity which is its sufficient distinctiveness. The paronomasia in II. 332^a is not intended or indispensable.

(vii) *Aprastutepraveśa* as Dandin conceives it involves *सुनि*, if not *सुनि* or *निद्रा*, but there is an absence of *अभिप्रेत* relation, and an implication of *प्रसून* through *सप्रसून* statement, in place of the direct statement of the two found in a *सुष्ययोगिता*.

(viii) *Vyajastuti* (II. 343) involves *सुनि* (or *निद्रा*) but it is feigned. And it is a *सुनि* made of a certain thing which might not be joined with any thing else in simile. A *सुष्ययोगिता* is necessarily based upon a relation between at least two things.

(ix) In *निद्रा* the *साम्य* between the two things is not a well-established fact so that we could know before hand which is *गुणोत्तर* or *गुणजित*. The *साम्य* is evolved just in the very act presented to our eyes.

Notes to II. 333-339.—(i) All writers except Bharata admit *विशेष* as a distinct figure. A few leading definitions are given below:—

Agnipurana (344. 28)—

समलोचनी मुक्ता सदर्शनस्यमानयो. ।
विशेषपूर्णकेन लक्षणेन इति स्मृतम् ॥

Bhāmaha (III. 24) and *Udbhaṭa* (p. 59)—

गुणस्य वा विद्याया वा विद्वत्स्यविद्याभिरा [v. 1] वच. ।
वा [v. 1, वच] विशेषाभिधानाय विशेषे न विदुर्मुखा [v. 1 प्रवक्षते] ॥

Kudrata (ix. 30)—

यस्मिन् द्रव्यादीनां परस्परं लक्षणा विद्वानाम् ।
एकत्रासक्याने समकालं वर्तनं न विशेष ॥

Vaṃana (IV. III. 12) and *Ruyyaka* (p. 121)—

विद्वद्भाषायां विशेषः ।

(ii) The figure is said to be वाच्य when a word like अर्थ is used in the statement; otherwise it is अर्थ. This division is however disputed (cp. Rasagangādharā p 428). It is called सुप्र when not based upon अर्थ or परोन्यासा. Dandin's last example (II 339) is अर्थसुप्र. The ten-fold division of the figure given by most writers is, like that of वाच्य or अर्थ, based upon the four-fold रीति of words recognised by grammarians Jagannātha (p 426) rightly calls this classification अर्थ. Bhoja gives four kinds, viz. अर्थ, प्रत्यक्ष, अधिक, and स्थिति. Rudrata gives 13 varieties, denying the validity of अर्थ-रीति, and adding 4 additional varieties (cp ix. 33, exemplified in ix. 41-44) not generally recognised by other Alamkārikas. Dandin's classification is based on no definite principles.

(iii) Virodhā enters into the composition of a number of other figures such as वाच्य (II 33), अर्थ (II 34), अर्थ (II 109), etc., while figures like सुप्र or certain varieties of अर्थ are, on ultimate analysis, special kinds of अर्थ only. Cp the list of अर्थ-रीति figures on p 18 above, as also Note (iii) on p 19. Illustration is in fact even observed in अर्थ-रीति as in अर्थ-रीति. विरोध (विरोधादिनाम) गुणोक्तम् अर्थ-रीति. The Kavīprakāśakāra however takes a different view. These Alamkāras, as in the special cases of अर्थ and having a distinct charm of their own, are not treated as independent figures. For the sake of uniformity (cp p 171) the same figure is called अर्थ-रीति.



(ii) It will be seen that while to later writers—

अप्रत्युत्पन्नत्वेन प्रत्युत्पन्नप्रतीतिः is अप्रत्युत्पन्नाया ;

to Dandin—

अप्रत्युत्पन्नत्वेन प्रत्युत्पन्नप्रतीतिः is अप्रत्युत्पन्ना.

This has saved Dandin from the necessity (i) of distinguishing this figure from मयागोष्ठि, अर्षान्तरदास, श्रेय, etc.; and (ii) of explaining the circumstances which make it possible for the अप्रत्युत्पन्न to suggest प्रत्युत्पन्न. These circumstances give the several varieties of the figure as admitted by subsequent writers. In order to show how very complicated the whole business of classification has become at the hands of these later writers we give below a tabular statement based on the Kavya-prakāśa—

अप्रत्युत्पन्नप्रतीतिः	(i)	कारणे प्रत्युत्पन्ने काव्याभिधानम्
	(ii)	कारणे प्रत्युत्पन्ने काव्याभिधानम्
	(iii)	मात्रान्वये प्रत्युत्पन्ने विशेषाभिधानम्
	(iv)	विशेषे प्रत्युत्पन्ने सामान्याभिधानम्
	(v)	श्रुत्ये प्रत्युत्पन्ने श्रुत्याभिधानम्

Variety (v) further divided into

A. Use of श्रुत्ये words for (विशेषण + विशेष्य)	B Through श्रुत्ये as in मयागोष्ठि (with विशेषण alone श्रुत्ये)	C. Through simple श्रुत्ये

Or again, independently, into

A. अनवधारितेन	B. अवधारितेन	C. अवधारितेन
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(iii) Bhoja gives for अप्रत्युत्पन्नप्रतीति the twofold classification into काव्या and प्रत्युत्पन्ना, his instance for the latter being Dandin's illustration in II. 341 paraphrased ; viz.—

कार्यं वनेषु हरिणलुण्ठानि वादन्त्यवधनमुपभ्रमः ।

विदधति धनितु न हेतुं मे दिनं पलायं वदं मर्यादम् ॥

(ii) It will be seen that while to later writers—

अप्रस्तुतवर्णनेन प्रस्तुतवर्णनप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा ;

to Dandin—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसनेन प्रस्तुतनिन्दप्रतीतिः is अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा.

This has saved Dandin from the necessity (i) of distinguishing this figure from समाशेषिक, अर्थान्तरव्यास, श्लेष, etc.; and (ii) of explaining the circumstances which make it possible for the अप्रस्तुत to suggest प्रस्तुत. These circumstances give the several varieties of the figure as admitted by subsequent writers. In order to show how very complicated the whole business of classification has become at the hands of these later writers we give below a tabular statement based on the *Kāvya-prakāśa*—

अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा	(i) कार्ये प्रस्तुते कारणभिधानम्
	(ii) कारणे प्रस्तुते कार्याभिधानम्
	(iii) सामान्ये प्रस्तुते विशेषाभिधानम्
	(iv) विशेषे प्रस्तुते सामान्याभिधानम्
	(v) मुख्ये प्रस्तुते दुर्न्यायनरभिधानम्

Variety (v) further divided into

A. Use of शिष्ट words for विशेषण + विशेष्य	B. Through अवधारणे as in समाशेषिक (with विशेषण alone शिष्ट)	C. Through simple सामान्य

Or again, independently, into

A. अवधारणेन	B. अवशारेण	C. अवशेषव्याप्तेन
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(iii) Bhoja gives for अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा the twofold classification into वाक्या and प्रत्येकवाक्य, his instance for the latter being Dandin's illustration in II. 341 paraphrased :
viz.—

कार्ये बनेषु हरिणसूक्तानि राघवन्दयन्तुतमसि ।
विशेष्ये यन्ति न देव्यं ते विन पश्ये सर्व मयिद-

(ii) It will be noted that all writers except Dandin, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana consider both निन्द्यास्तुतिः and स्तुत्या निन्दा as the legitimate spheres of the figure. It is not certain therefore whether Dandin really would permit the उपलक्षण which we have put upon the definition in our Sanskrit Commentary II. 343'. Randraṣa gives the figure as a variety of श्लेषयुक्त figures, and so requires that it be based necessarily upon paronomasia. Bhoja, finally, makes no distinction between व्याजस्तुति and स्तुति defined as in Kāvyaḍarī II. 268.

(iii) According to Dandin's view it seems that Leśa No 2 is distinguished by the presence of a subtle element in the praise or blame, while in a व्याजस्तुति no such subtle element is necessary. This is the only distinction between these two figures. Hence we must either suppose that Dandin did not intend to accept Leśa No 2 without reserve, or that Bhoja is justified in making स्तुति = व्याजस्तुति.

(iv) In an अग्रस्तुतया there are two things: a प्रस्तुत and an अग्रस्तुत. Further the स्तुति of the अग्रस्तुत is real and not intended to be withdrawn. So also the निन्दा of the अग्रस्तुत. The स्तुति and निन्दा, it is also to be noted, is of two distinct things: it is not a case that the same thing is outwardly censured but really praised [and vice versa], as in a व्याजस्तुति.

(v) Similarly, while in व्याजस्तुति the apparent निन्दा is to be ultimately set aside, and स्तुति obtained by implication, the case is not one of simple चरि, in as much as the शब्द is here entirely thrown overboard—a thing which does not necessarily happen in an ordinary चरि. Cp. on the point Jagannātha (p. 416)—
अत एव नास्या चरितम् । चरिो हि शब्देनागूढमहिम्नार्थान्तरमवगम्यते । न चेवं प्रकृते ।

(vi) Bhoja quotes both the examples given by Dandin and remarks (p. 410)—
व्याजस्तुतिर्गुणश्लेषोऽनवस्थानोऽप्येवमवस्थान इत्यम् ।

(vii) In II. 345° श्लेष is a better reading than श्लेष, but we have no Ma. authority for adopting the improved reading.

Jagannatha (p. 339)—

उपपत्तयोर्धयोरायामेद् ओपपत्तयोर्धयोरायामेद् निदर्शना ।

and Vīkṣvare (p. 263)—

उपपत्तयोर्धयोरायामेद् ओपपत्तयोर्धयोरायामेद् निदर्शना ।

यच्च विद्यया वाच्यतायां निदर्शना सोऽपि ॥

(ii) It will be observed that Dandin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, and others admit what is known as the *वोपन-निदर्शना* as the only variety of the figure, while Mammata and most other writers admit an additional variety. Dandin's conception of this figure has the advantage of keeping true to the etymological sense of the figure.

(iii) This *वोपननिदर्शना* is the same as the *सम्बन्धनिदर्शना* of Ruyyaka, Vīśvanātha, and most later writers. As Appaya Dīkṣita observes in his *Chandrikā* (p. 74)—
 स्तब्धकथा परान् प्रति सदसदर्थोपपत्तौ सम्बन्धे समता गर्भकरोति । To the same effect also Jagannatha (p. 345). The second, and with later writers, the more usual variety is *वार्तमाननिदर्शना* divided into *वाच्यार्थनिदर्शना* and *वदार्थनिदर्शना*, a good example of the former being *Mudrārākṣha* (vii 6)—

केनोक्तुमिच्छामास कथापरिच्छेदे च पृथगे शिरो

पार्श्वे केन गद्यमतेरुचिता सद्यः समापदिता ।

केनैकपदज्ञवसितगतं मिहोर्वित् पथे

भीम केन च नेकवचनवतो दोष्ठी प्रतीकोपेक्ष ॥

The qualification which requires a *सम्बन्धनिदर्शना* relation between the two statements is to be noted. This relation has to be assumed in order to explain the *prima facie* impossibility of the relation between the two statements, which is dogmatically asserted. As Dandin does not recognise this *वोपन* variety, we need not enter in details into the exact scope of the figure as also its distinction from *रहस्य*, which is another figure not recognised by our author. See on the point *Alamkārasaṁgraha* (p. 77).

(iv) Bhoja (p. 299 ff.) introduces in Dandin's *निदर्शना* one or two minor principles of sub-division. The similarity is directly asserted in the statement or is left to be inferred. [The former is *व्युत्पत्ति* the latter,

Vagbhata (p. 38)—

सहभाषक्यर्त्तम सहेति ।

Kesavamisra (p. 36)—

समानाद्योक्तिः सहेति । सा द्वयी—सहाधीनयोस्त्वदाप्रतिपक्षे कार्य-
कारणयोरपि ।

Hamachandra (p. 273)—

सहार्थवत्तादर्थस्त्वान्वयः सहेति ।

Vidyānātha (p. 400)—

सहार्थान्वयो यत्र भवेदतिशयोक्तिः ।
कन्तिनोपभ्यस्येन्ना सा सहेति, सिद्धीयते ॥

Visvapātha (x 55)—

सहार्थस्य वत्तोदकं यत्र व्यापारक द्वयोः ।
सा सहेति, पूर्वतन्मूल्यानिशयोक्तिर्यदा भवेत् ॥

and Jagannātha (p. 357)—

गणद्वयं न भाषावर्त्तन्त्यस्य साहचर्यं सहेति ।

(iii) The statement of simultaneity between the qualities or attributes of two objects, which constitutes the substance of this lecture is not a matter of fact description as in पुत्रः सहोक्तः पिता । It is अतिशयोक्तिमुक्तक Ruy-
raka however goes further and says (p. 31)—एतन्न नियमेना
निशयोक्तिमुक्तकमस्मात् । सा अतिशयोक्तिः । यत्र दक्षिणोऽधीनस्यार्थवत्पर्ययकत्वं
अर्थादाश्रययोगात् । न । अर्थादयमस्य व्यापारकत्वमप्युच्यते । Ruyraka
thus recognises the fact that the quality of सहोक्ति
based on the simultaneousness of the two objects is not a matter of
fact but a matter of convention. Jagannātha remarks how-
ever by way of example (p. 357) ॥ ३५७ ॥ ३५८ ॥ ३५९ ॥ ३६० ॥ ३६१ ॥ ३६२ ॥ ३६३ ॥ ३६४ ॥ ३६५ ॥ ३६६ ॥ ३६७ ॥ ३६८ ॥ ३६९ ॥ ३७० ॥ ३७१ ॥ ३७२ ॥ ३७३ ॥ ३७४ ॥ ३७५ ॥ ३७६ ॥ ३७७ ॥ ३७८ ॥ ३७९ ॥ ३८० ॥ ३८१ ॥ ३८२ ॥ ३८३ ॥ ३८४ ॥ ३८५ ॥ ३८६ ॥ ३८७ ॥ ३८८ ॥ ३८९ ॥ ३९० ॥ ३९१ ॥ ३९२ ॥ ३९३ ॥ ३९४ ॥ ३९५ ॥ ३९६ ॥ ३९७ ॥ ३९८ ॥ ३९९ ॥ ४०० ॥ ४०१ ॥ ४०२ ॥ ४०३ ॥ ४०४ ॥ ४०५ ॥ ४०६ ॥ ४०७ ॥ ४०८ ॥ ४०९ ॥ ४१० ॥ ४११ ॥ ४१२ ॥ ४१३ ॥ ४१४ ॥ ४१५ ॥ ४१६ ॥ ४१७ ॥ ४१८ ॥ ४१९ ॥ ४२० ॥ ४२१ ॥ ४२२ ॥ ४२३ ॥ ४२४ ॥ ४२५ ॥ ४२६ ॥ ४२७ ॥ ४२८ ॥ ४२९ ॥ ४३० ॥ ४३१ ॥ ४३२ ॥ ४३३ ॥ ४३४ ॥ ४३५ ॥ ४३६ ॥ ४३७ ॥ ४३८ ॥ ४३९ ॥ ४४० ॥ ४४१ ॥ ४४२ ॥ ४४३ ॥ ४४४ ॥ ४४५ ॥ ४४६ ॥ ४४७ ॥ ४४८ ॥ ४४९ ॥ ४५० ॥ ४५१ ॥ ४५२ ॥ ४५३ ॥ ४५४ ॥ ४५५ ॥ ४५६ ॥ ४५७ ॥ ४५८ ॥ ४५९ ॥ ४६० ॥ ४६१ ॥ ४६२ ॥ ४६३ ॥ ४६४ ॥ ४६५ ॥ ४६६ ॥ ४६७ ॥ ४६८ ॥ ४६९ ॥ ४७० ॥ ४७१ ॥ ४७२ ॥ ४७३ ॥ ४७४ ॥ ४७५ ॥ ४७६ ॥ ४७७ ॥ ४७८ ॥ ४७९ ॥ ४८० ॥ ४८१ ॥ ४८२ ॥ ४८३ ॥ ४८४ ॥ ४८५ ॥ ४८६ ॥ ४८७ ॥ ४८८ ॥ ४८९ ॥ ४९० ॥ ४९१ ॥ ४९२ ॥ ४९३ ॥ ४९४ ॥ ४९५ ॥ ४९६ ॥ ४९७ ॥ ४९८ ॥ ४९९ ॥ ५०० ॥ ५०१ ॥ ५०२ ॥ ५०३ ॥ ५०४ ॥ ५०५ ॥ ५०६ ॥ ५०७ ॥ ५०८ ॥ ५०९ ॥ ५१० ॥ ५११ ॥ ५१२ ॥ ५१३ ॥ ५१४ ॥ ५१५ ॥ ५१६ ॥ ५१७ ॥ ५१८ ॥ ५१९ ॥ ५२० ॥ ५२१ ॥ ५२२ ॥ ५२३ ॥ ५२४ ॥ ५२५ ॥ ५२६ ॥ ५२७ ॥ ५२८ ॥ ५२९ ॥ ५३० ॥ ५३१ ॥ ५३२ ॥ ५३३ ॥ ५३४ ॥ ५३५ ॥ ५३६ ॥ ५३७ ॥ ५३८ ॥ ५३९ ॥ ५४० ॥ ५४१ ॥ ५४२ ॥ ५४३ ॥ ५४४ ॥ ५४५ ॥ ५४६ ॥ ५४७ ॥ ५४८ ॥ ५४९ ॥ ५५० ॥ ५५१ ॥ ५५२ ॥ ५५३ ॥ ५५४ ॥ ५५५ ॥ ५५६ ॥ ५५७ ॥ ५५८ ॥ ५५९ ॥ ५६० ॥ ५६१ ॥ ५६२ ॥ ५६३ ॥ ५६४ ॥ ५६५ ॥ ५६६ ॥ ५६७ ॥ ५६८ ॥ ५६९ ॥ ५७० ॥ ५७१ ॥ ५७२ ॥ ५७३ ॥ ५७४ ॥ ५७५ ॥ ५७६ ॥ ५७७ ॥ ५७८ ॥ ५७९ ॥ ५८० ॥ ५८१ ॥ ५८२ ॥ ५८३ ॥ ५८४ ॥ ५८५ ॥ ५८६ ॥ ५८७ ॥ ५८८ ॥ ५८९ ॥ ५९० ॥ ५९१ ॥ ५९२ ॥ ५९३ ॥ ५९४ ॥ ५९५ ॥ ५९६ ॥ ५९७ ॥ ५९८ ॥ ५९९ ॥ ६०० ॥ ६०१ ॥ ६०२ ॥ ६०३ ॥ ६०४ ॥ ६०५ ॥ ६०६ ॥ ६०७ ॥ ६०८ ॥ ६०९ ॥ ६१० ॥ ६११ ॥ ६१२ ॥ ६१३ ॥ ६१४ ॥ ६१५ ॥ ६१६ ॥ ६१७ ॥ ६१८ ॥ ६१९ ॥ ६२० ॥ ६२१ ॥ ६२२ ॥ ६२३ ॥ ६२४ ॥ ६२५ ॥ ६२६ ॥ ६२७ ॥ ६२८ ॥ ६२९ ॥ ६३० ॥ ६३१ ॥ ६३२ ॥ ६३३ ॥ ६३४ ॥ ६३५ ॥ ६३६ ॥ ६३७ ॥ ६३८ ॥ ६३९ ॥ ६४० ॥ ६४१ ॥ ६४२ ॥ ६४३ ॥ ६४४ ॥ ६४५ ॥ ६४६ ॥ ६४७ ॥ ६४८ ॥ ६४९ ॥ ६५० ॥ ६५१ ॥ ६५२ ॥ ६५३ ॥ ६५४ ॥ ६५५ ॥ ६५६ ॥ ६५७ ॥ ६५८ ॥ ६५९ ॥ ६६० ॥ ६६१ ॥ ६६२ ॥ ६६३ ॥ ६६४ ॥ ६६५ ॥ ६६६ ॥ ६६७ ॥ ६६८ ॥ ६६९ ॥ ६७० ॥ ६७१ ॥ ६७२ ॥ ६७३ ॥ ६७४ ॥ ६७५ ॥ ६७६ ॥ ६७७ ॥ ६७८ ॥ ६७९ ॥ ६८० ॥ ६८१ ॥ ६८२ ॥ ६८३ ॥ ६८४ ॥ ६८५ ॥ ६८६ ॥ ६८७ ॥ ६८८ ॥ ६८९ ॥ ६९० ॥ ६९१ ॥ ६९२ ॥ ६९३ ॥ ६९४ ॥ ६९५ ॥ ६९६ ॥ ६९७ ॥ ६९८ ॥ ६९९ ॥ ७०० ॥ ७०१ ॥ ७०२ ॥ ७०३ ॥ ७०४ ॥ ७०५ ॥ ७०६ ॥ ७०७ ॥ ७०८ ॥ ७०९ ॥ ७१० ॥ ७११ ॥ ७१२ ॥ ७१३ ॥ ७१४ ॥ ७१५ ॥ ७१६ ॥ ७१७ ॥ ७१८ ॥ ७१९ ॥ ७२० ॥ ७२१ ॥ ७२२ ॥ ७२३ ॥ ७२४ ॥ ७२५ ॥ ७२६ ॥ ७२७ ॥ ७२८ ॥ ७२९ ॥ ७३० ॥ ७३१ ॥ ७३२ ॥ ७३३ ॥ ७३४ ॥ ७३५ ॥ ७३६ ॥ ७३७ ॥ ७३८ ॥ ७३९ ॥ ७४० ॥ ७४१ ॥ ७४२ ॥ ७४३ ॥ ७४४ ॥ ७४५ ॥ ७४६ ॥ ७४७ ॥ ७४८ ॥ ७४९ ॥ ७५० ॥ ७५१ ॥ ७५२ ॥ ७५३ ॥ ७५४ ॥ ७५५ ॥ ७५६ ॥ ७५७ ॥ ७५८ ॥ ७५९ ॥ ७६० ॥ ७६१ ॥ ७६२ ॥ ७६३ ॥ ७६४ ॥ ७६५ ॥ ७६६ ॥ ७६७ ॥ ७६८ ॥ ७६९ ॥ ७७० ॥ ७७१ ॥ ७७२ ॥ ७७३ ॥ ७७४ ॥ ७७५ ॥ ७७६ ॥ ७७७ ॥ ७७८ ॥ ७७९ ॥ ७८० ॥ ७८१ ॥ ७८२ ॥ ७८३ ॥ ७८४ ॥ ७८५ ॥ ७८६ ॥ ७८७ ॥ ७८८ ॥ ७८९ ॥ ७९० ॥ ७९१ ॥ ७९२ ॥ ७९३ ॥ ७९४ ॥ ७९५ ॥ ७९६ ॥ ७९७ ॥ ७९८ ॥ ७९९ ॥ ८०० ॥ ८०१ ॥ ८०२ ॥ ८०३ ॥ ८०४ ॥ ८०५ ॥ ८०६ ॥ ८०७ ॥ ८०८ ॥ ८०९ ॥ ८१० ॥ ८११ ॥ ८१२ ॥ ८१३ ॥ ८१४ ॥ ८१५ ॥ ८१६ ॥ ८१७ ॥ ८१८ ॥ ८१९ ॥ ८२० ॥ ८२१ ॥ ८२२ ॥ ८२३ ॥ ८२४ ॥ ८२५ ॥ ८२६ ॥ ८२७ ॥ ८२८ ॥ ८२९ ॥ ८३० ॥ ८३१ ॥ ८३२ ॥ ८३३ ॥ ८३४ ॥ ८३५ ॥ ८३६ ॥ ८३७ ॥ ८३८ ॥ ८३९ ॥ ८४० ॥ ८४१ ॥ ८४२ ॥ ८४३ ॥ ८४४ ॥ ८४५ ॥ ८४६ ॥ ८४७ ॥ ८४८ ॥ ८४९ ॥ ८५० ॥ ८५१ ॥ ८५२ ॥ ८५३ ॥ ८५४ ॥ ८५५ ॥ ८५६ ॥ ८५७ ॥ ८५८ ॥ ८५९ ॥ ८६० ॥ ८६१ ॥ ८६२ ॥ ८६३ ॥ ८६४ ॥ ८६५ ॥ ८६६ ॥ ८६७ ॥ ८६८ ॥ ८६९ ॥ ८७० ॥ ८७१ ॥ ८७२ ॥ ८७३ ॥ ८७४ ॥ ८७५ ॥ ८७६ ॥ ८७७ ॥ ८७८ ॥ ८७९ ॥ ८८० ॥ ८८१ ॥ ८८२ ॥ ८८३ ॥ ८८४ ॥ ८८५ ॥ ८८६ ॥ ८८७ ॥ ८८८ ॥ ८८९ ॥ ८९० ॥ ८९१ ॥ ८९२ ॥ ८९३ ॥ ८९४ ॥ ८९५ ॥ ८९६ ॥ ८९७ ॥ ८९८ ॥ ८९९ ॥ ९०० ॥ ९०१ ॥ ९०२ ॥ ९०३ ॥ ९०४ ॥ ९०५ ॥ ९०६ ॥ ९०७ ॥ ९०८ ॥ ९०९ ॥ ९१० ॥ ९११ ॥ ९१२ ॥ ९१३ ॥ ९१४ ॥ ९१५ ॥ ९१६ ॥ ९१७ ॥ ९१८ ॥ ९१९ ॥ ९२० ॥ ९२१ ॥ ९२२ ॥ ९२३ ॥ ९२४ ॥ ९२५ ॥ ९२६ ॥ ९२७ ॥ ९२८ ॥ ९२९ ॥ ९३० ॥ ९३१ ॥ ९३२ ॥ ९३३ ॥ ९३४ ॥ ९३५ ॥ ९३६ ॥ ९३७ ॥ ९३८ ॥ ९३९ ॥ ९४० ॥ ९४१ ॥ ९४२ ॥ ९४३ ॥ ९४४ ॥ ९४५ ॥ ९४६ ॥ ९४७ ॥ ९४८ ॥ ९४९ ॥ ९५० ॥ ९५१ ॥ ९५२ ॥ ९५३ ॥ ९५४ ॥ ९५५ ॥ ९५६ ॥ ९५७ ॥ ९५८ ॥ ९५९ ॥ ९६० ॥ ९६१ ॥ ९६२ ॥ ९६३ ॥ ९६४ ॥ ९६५ ॥ ९६६ ॥ ९६७ ॥ ९६८ ॥ ९६९ ॥ ९७० ॥ ९७१ ॥ ९७२ ॥ ९७३ ॥ ९७४ ॥ ९७५ ॥ ९७६ ॥ ९७७ ॥ ९७८ ॥ ९७९ ॥ ९८० ॥ ९८१ ॥ ९८२ ॥ ९८३ ॥ ९८४ ॥ ९८५ ॥ ९८६ ॥ ९८७ ॥ ९८८ ॥ ९८९ ॥ ९९० ॥ ९९१ ॥ ९९२ ॥ ९९३ ॥ ९९४ ॥ ९९५ ॥ ९९६ ॥ ९९७ ॥ ९९८ ॥ ९९९ ॥ १००० ॥

एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति ।

इत्यादिवाक्योक्त्याप्युक्तं

एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति ।

हति सहोक्तिः अतिशयोक्तिः । एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति । The relation
between the two objects or qualities is a matter of fact or convention
should be merely एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति । एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति ।
एव च विविक्तव्यक्त्योऽपि सहेति ।

(ii) Two points deserve to be noted. The barter ought to be *swift* and *charming*. An actual commercial transaction however noteworthy cannot be an instance of this figure. Secondly, there ought to be a regular exchange in the transaction. Accordingly a case like—*ḥiḥi ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi ḥiḥi ḥiḥi ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi* or *ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi ḥiḥi ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi* where there is only a *ḥiḥiḥi* or *ḥiḥiḥi ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi* cannot be a regular *ḥiḥiḥi* in the normal acceptance of the term *ḥiḥiḥi*. Mammals and Japanese also are against admitting *ḥiḥiḥi*, while *ḥiḥi* and *ḥiḥi* admit it. Those attempts to hold the balance evenly by recognising *ḥiḥiḥi* as a sub variety of *ḥiḥiḥiḥiḥiḥi* the example of 1937 is

— 1937 —

(ii) At the same time It is necessary to point out that the 36 embellishments of speech involving specific emotional modes which are enumerated by Bharata at the beginning of the 16th Chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra, and which occur also in Jayadeva's Chandrāloka, Mayūkha iii, include (along with such things as गुणकीर्तन, प्रोत्साहन, आकन्द, प्रतिषेध, परिदेवन, etc.) आशीः or benediction. Now it must be admitted that, in a given situation, benediction can become a very effective mode of expressing one's thoughts; and a dramatist has every right to collect all such effective modes of expression together. But why Dandin should have selected only one of them for inclusion amongst the regular अलङ्कारs cannot be determined. We may however point out in passing that some others out of the 36 have been universally regarded as forming the basis of some of the regular figures.

(ii) It is worth noting—as pointing to an independence of tradition and perhaps an absence of interdependence between Dandin and Bhāmaha—that Dandin takes आशी as a regular benediction. Bhāmaha gives two illustrations for the figure. In the first (see our Com ii 357¹¹⁻¹²) two friends, who have been estranged from one another by malicious and mendacious go-betweens, perceive their error, and one of them calls upon the other to join hands again. On this Hemechendra remarks—ननु च नम्य चेतोऽग्निविशेष्ये वेदान्मा रतिमावविशेष्य आशीद्वारेण प्रतीयन् इति भाव्यनिरेक्षायम् । ... । अय आशास्वमानस्य मैत्रीनेकधर्म्योपनिबन्धो न न्दप्राप्तप्राप्ताच्छान्मिका आशी । In the second example also (see our Com ii 357¹²⁻¹³), Hemechendra points out that the hostile cities have already been vanquished. Hence, तथाविधानां शत्रुनगराणां दशेनमथ प्राप्तकालतया शत्रुनाशने । The illustration given by Dandin is of course अशप्तप्राप्ताग्निमिका आशी । And the same is the case with Vāgbbāṣa.

Notes to II. 358-359¹⁴ —(i) Before winding up his treatment of the regular *alamkāras* and passing on to a consideration of the mixed *alamkāras* (ii 360), Dandin

Notes to II. 361-362—(i) In the first half of ii. 361 there is an उपमा statement which can stand by itself. The उपमा is thus the principal figure. The भृतानुशलिनी considers the figure in the first half to be उत्प्रेक्षा; but आक्षिपति can be an उपमावाचकशब्द though not actually enumerated by Dandin. In the second half we have an अर्थान्तरन्यास based upon श्लेष. The particular statement about the invasion of the beauty of the face by lotuses is corroborated by the general fact that, given कोस and दण्ड, any body can invade. The awkwardness of the general statement containing a pronoun (एषा) referring to a noun in the particular statement can be got over by making एषाम्—एषा लोकानाम्. Nor is the difficulty so very serious at all. We need not accordingly make the figure a हेतु instead of an अर्थान्तरन्यास, as suggested by some commentators.

(ii) Dandin has not apparently given an illustration for सर्वेषां समकक्षता. The stanza ii. 362 (cp. ii. 226^{ab}) supplies the deficit. But it is omitted in most Mss. and Ch quotes the stanza with the remark—समकक्षतायां आयुदाहरणमन्यत्र दृश्यम्. It may be added in passing that Bhoja gives us his example for this kind of संयुति (which he calls निमित्तदुर्लभसंयुति) the extra stanza पितृवैव तरङ्गमे etc. mentioned in the variants to ii. 226 above. Even the भृतानुशलिनी does not notice ii. 362, and surely it would have been possible for Dandin, without repeating himself, to give another instance for समकक्षसंयुति if he had thought it necessary. We should in this connection recall the fact that Dandin has not given illustrations for all the मध्यर्थात्क. or the अन्वर्थात्क varieties. Compare our Commentary to ii. 104 ff.

Notes to II. 363 —(i) Of the three figures-of-speech contained in ii. 361 the relation between श्लेष and अर्थान्तरन्यास is perhaps much more immediate than that between अर्थान्तरन्यास and उपमा, but it would be incorrect to sug-

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probably goes back to Kātyādarī II. 364^{ab}, where however भव apparently is used in a rather peculiar sense. We would then translate it by Sustained Intuition especially as Dandin makes it a प्रबन्धविद्यगुण. Bhāmaha also calls it (II. 52) a प्रबन्धविद्यगुण laying down for it the four-fold requirement, viz—

विशदं दण्डमुत्प्रेक्ष्य कथायां स्वमित्रं दत्तम् ।
सत्प्रबन्धतया चेति तस्य हेतुं प्रवर्तनम् ॥

But Dandin's requirements for the figure as enumerated in II. 365-366 seem to be peculiar to him, as also his whole conception of the same, wherein he is probably following a tradition distinct from that of Bhāmaha. Phoja's conception of Bhāvika (which he identifies with उद्देश, iv. 85-86) is so very far removed from the two conceptions discussed hitherto that it need not be here taken into consideration at all.

(iii) The Bhāvika of later writers is distinguishable from the गुण called प्रवाद, the रग named भवगुण, and अलंकारिका स्वभावानि or प्रतिमाना or अतिशयोक्ति. Compare माहिस्यदर्शन (x p. 574f)—न वाय प्रवादोऽप्यो गुण भवभावितो प्रवृत्तभावमात्रेणैव तस्याहेतुत्वात् । न वा भवगुणो रग विस्मय प्रसन्नस्य हेतुत्वात् । न वा अतिशयोक्तिरलंकारा अप्यवयवाभावात् । न च प्रतिमाना भवभावितो भूतभावितयैव प्रवादनात् । न च स्वभावानि तस्या स्तिष्ठितस्तुतस्तुमधर्मस्वभावस्यैव यथावदूर्णनं रूपमस्य तु वस्तुन प्रवृत्तभावमात्रेणैव विच्छिन्नचित्तवैरोन्मीलितम् । Hemachandra however refuses to admit this figure. He says (p. 293)—भाविकं तु भूतभावितदार्थप्रत्यक्षावगात्मकमभिनेयप्रबन्ध एव भवति । यद्यपि गुणकदो रस्यने तथापि न तत्र स्वदेतः ।

(iv) Confining our attention to Dandin's own conception of भाविक it will be observed that Dandin's treatment of it is quite in place, coming as it does after his treatment of वनेति, whereas, it is not quite clear why Bhāmaha should have called his भाविक a प्रबन्धविद्यगुण. Bhāvika is the quality belonging to a poem taken as a whole, and it suggests the formulation of questions like,—Is there a meaning to the whole? Is it consistently carried out? Is there a harmony and proportion of parts? Is it a clear and self-sufficient theme? These are questions of higher

